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The Lumpkin Law School
At the regular meeting of t h e Trustees of the University of
Georgia in 1859, the board determined to reorganize the University,
and in the plan t h a t was then adopted i t was determined to establish
a law school, "in which facilities f o r the best legal education would
be afforded."
In pursuance of the plan, on August 4, 1859, on motion of Governor Herschel V. Johnson, Joseph Henry Lumpkin (the
first Chief Justice of Georgia), William Hope Hull and Thomas R.
R. Cobb were elected professors, and the law school opened in the autumn of that year. On December 19, 1859, by an Act of t h e General
hsembly of Georgia, the Lumpkin Law School was incorporated, and
these three gentlemen were both the incorporators and the professors.
From that time to the death of Judge Lumpkin in 1867 (Mr. Cobb
having died in 1862), the Law Department of the University was
conducted under the name of the Lumpkin Law School, and the graduates were awarded their diplomas by the Trustees a t the regular
Commencement.
The exercises of the law school were suspended
during the War between the States. Since 1867 the Law School has
been conducted under the name of the Law Department of the University of Georgia.
SKETCHES
OF FOUNDERS
William Hope Hull was a t one time law partner of Governor Howell Cobb. He was a deep student of t h e law. Added to broad scholarship his was a well balanced temperament and judgment. His opinion was sought in many cases in which he did not appear. H i s great
strength lay in his ability to give wise counsel.
Joseph Henry Lumpkin was Georgia's f i r s t Chief Justice. To
the decisions of the Court, rendered during the years shortly a f t e r
its establishment, one must look for the systematizing, harmonising
of the laws; the application of the laws to the affairs of the citizens
of the State. That Chief Justice Lumpkin was easily f i r s t in this
work, no one, familiar with those early formative opinions of the
Court, can doubt.
Thomas R. R. Cobb was many minded. He won distinction in
many fields; in education, religion, war, law. His impress upon the
laws of the State is deeper than t h a t made by any other person. He
was a lawyer in full practice, reporter f o r the Supreme C o u r t 4 : l " piler of Cobb's Digest of the Laws of Georgia, and one of t6e coma
mittee of three which codified the laws of the State.
him fell
largely the codification of the substantive law. The corhmittee- w.-,
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ranged the laws by subjects, harmonizing them, omitted redundancies and repetitions, added new laws, and produced a symmetrical
whole, a great law book, perhaps the first of the kind in the Union.
Unique is the codification of the doctrines of equity, elsewhere there
were codes of Procedure, this is a code of all the laws of the State.

FOUNDATION
A N D GROWTH
More than half a century ago these three distinguished Georgians
founded a law school which exists today a s the Law Department of
the University of Georgia. While methods of legal study and education have, in these years, changed, nay undergone a revolution, the
great underlying principles of the founders are today the inspiration
of the teachers and the norm of the progress of this school. No men
were by temperament and training better fitted to impress on the
students the due relation of principles and practice, the accurate adjustment of the laws to the law. Thus this school seeks to instill
those unchangeable principles of the law which must animate all philosophically framed rules of conduct, and a t the same time give actual
practice a s f a r a s possible in the application of those rules. While
i t strives to attain a standard of excellence in the academic training
of the lawyer, law is a business, the most intensely practical, of all
human pursuits.
The high standard of professional honor and courtesy set by the
founders is the priceless heritage of the school today. Unceasing
effort in all the work of the school, is made to impress t h e student
with the solemn responsibility of the lawyer, and the sacredness of
the trust imposed upon him. The ideals of the school a r e high and
clean.
For many years the school has been moving forward steadily, and
a s rapidly a s the conditions in the state allow. More than ten years
ago the Law Department became in reality a n integral part of the
University, and the transfer from the Academic to the Law School of
any but worthy men ceased. The adoption of the two years' course
soon followed. The wisdom, if not the necessity, of that action was
never doubtful. The efficiency of the work was more than doubled.
The approval of the State Bar Association has been repeatedly expressed. The election of additional teachers has been an untold advantage. The requirement of fifteen academic units for entrance
went into operatipn with the opening of the session of 1908, and has
borne good fruit in the better class of students admitted.
Beginning with the autumn term of 1919, the course for graduation was extended to three years. The successful inauguration of
this change was evidenced by the gratifying attendance upon the
first year course. Beginning with September, 1924, the entrance requirement is one year of college work.
Among the many advantages offered by the school most worthy
of note is the connection with the University. The advantages of
this connection a t once occur to the student. Access to the academic
schools, the libraries, debating societies, participation in literary and
other University activities, wider acquaintanceship with the young
men of the Stat,e University fellowship is invaluable to the lawyer.
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That a n institution cherishing such ideals and earnestly endeavoring to fulfill its obligations to State and people receive the recognition of Georgia i s no surprise to its alumni, and is a source of
gratification to all friends of thorough training f o r the practice of
the profession.
HISTORICAL
In 1867 Benjamin H. Hill and William L. Mitchell were elected
by the Trustees to fill the two vacancies.
From the time of Mr. Hill's election to the United States Senate
in 1877, his connection with the school was nominal, and the classes
were under the sole care of Mr. Mitchell until 1881, when Pope Barrow and George Dudley Thomas were elected professors of law. Dr.
Mitchell died in 1882 and Mr. Barrow resigned in 1883. I n 1884
Andrew J. Cobb was elected, and from t h a t time until 1890 Mr. Thomas and Mr. Cobb filled the Chairs.
SKETCHESOF TEACHERS
Benjamin H. Hill, a s all know, was one of Georgia's greatest sons.
As a logical debater he was supreme. His command of strong, forceful language was unexcelled. He honored the State a t the bar, in
the United States House and Senate.
William L. Mitchell was one of the most experienced teachers
who ever filled a chair in the school. His knowledge of the underlying principles of law was phenomenal. The teaching, in his day,
was by daily quiz from text books.
He never openel a book in class.
His memory of the subject made i t unnecessary.
George Dudley Thomas, while a young man, went easily to the
front of the bar. Few lawyers have in the same length of time attained such signal success a s he did. His mind was clear, analytical,
and his ability to communicate his knowledge equalled his mental
concept.
Andrew J. Cobb was one of t h e profoundest lawyers every living
in the State. His opinions, a s a Supreme Court Justice have been
cited more frequently than those of any other member of t h a t Court.
His temperament was equable, his manners courteous.
I n expressing his convictions he was fearless. Of him i t was said: "He was
strong as steel and pure a s prayer."
In 1890, Howell Cobb was elected. I n 1893 Mr. Thomas and Mr.
Andrew J. Cobb having resigned a s regular professors, and become
lecturers, Sylvanus Morris was elected.
The chair of lecturer on Medical Jurisprudence was filled by Dr.
R. D. Moore from 1873, to 1879 by Dr. R. M. Smith, from 1880 to
1883 by Dr. John Gerdine, and in 1883 Dr. S. C. Benedict was elected. In 1907, Dr. Benedict having resigned, T. F. Green was elected
Lecturer on Medical Jurisprudence. In 1908, Mr. Green having resigned, Dr. James C. Bloomfield was elected Lecturer on Medical
Jurisprudence.
From 1873 to the time of his death in January 1888, Chancellor
P. H. Me11 delivered lectures on Parliamei~taryLaw to the class in
connection with the Senior class in other departments of the University. In 1894 John D. Me11 was elected Lecturer on Parliamentary
Law.

G

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

Dr. J. H. T. McPherson was elected Lecturer in Roman Law in
1899.
In 1900 Sylvanus Morris was elected Dean.
In 1901 the Course of Study was extended from one to two years.
In 1906 Thomas F. Green was elected Lecturer on Federal Procedure.
In 1908 Hon. Andrew J. Cobb was elected Lecturer on Procedure
and Constitutional Law.
In 1909, Hon. Howell Cobb having resigned as regular professor
and having been made professor emeritus, Mr. Thomas F. Green was
elected regular professor of Law.
Hon. Howell Cobb died during the year 1909.
In 1909, John D. Me11 resigned as Lecturer on Parliamentary Law.
In 1912 Joseph S. Stewart was elected Lecturer on Parliamentary
Law.
In 1913 H. Abit Nix was elected Instructor in Law.
In 1916 the Chair of Medical Jurisprudence was abolished.
In 1918 Messrs. Green and Nix resigned and Messrs. Walter G.
Cornett and Henry G. Howard were elected Instructors in Law. Mr.
Howard was called to the military service, and resigned. Mr. Stephen C. Upson was elected to the vacancy in 1919.
In 1919, the building, the "Lumpkin Law School," was formally
opened.
In 1920 the course was extended to three years.
The subjects of Parliamentry Law and Medical Jurisprudence
are now in charge of Hon. George F. Gober and Prof. W. G. Cornett,
respectively.
In June 1921, the Faculty was reorganized, the three members
in office being retained, Professors Cornett and Upson being made
regular professors, and Hon. b d r e w J. Cobb being elected a regular
professor. In 1923 R. L. McWhorter was elected professor.
In 1924 entrance requirement of one year of college work was
adopted.
In 1923, Robert L. McWhorter was elected instructor and in 1925
was made full professor.
In 1925, Hon. George F. Gober was elected President.
In 1925, entrance requirement of two years of college work was
adopted.
EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES
Some years ago the graduates and friends of the school purchased the present Law Building. The equipment and facilities are
ample, except for the lack of library space and reading rooms. The
library contains many valuable publications which are now procurable.
Within the last two years additions of modern works, text-books, reports, digests have been made. The library is now as complete as
any one of the size to be found in the State.
GRADUATES
To name the graduates of the school who have attained distinction would too greatly extend this sketch. They have been United
States Senators, Congressmen, Governors, and Chief Justice, and As-
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sociate Justices of the State Supreme Court; Justices of the Court
of Appeals; Judges of the Superior, City, County Courts, Solicitora
General, and Solicitors of other Courts. In every legislature are
found graduates of the School who take prominent part in the deliberations. In practically every County of the State the graduates of
the School have taken and are now taking prominent position in the
affairs of the community. I t has been said by one, not a graduate,
that ;
"No single institution has made a deeper impress upon the life
of the State than the University Law Department. During the half
century of its existence nearly one thousand graduates have left its
halls, whose lives and achievements in peace and war have blessed
the State."-
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Competitive Conspiracy
HAROLD
HIRSCH
The limitations to which this article will be confined must f i r s t
be stated. Unfair competition can readily be divided into two groups;
the one dealing with "passing off", t h a t is, the selling of one man's
goods a s those of another, whether by way of substitution or infringement of a trademark, the other dealing with what has been
called "economic unfair competition", that is, any competition t h a t is
not based upon efficiency. The former is based upon fraud and deception, while the latter i s based upon a n interference with the natural law of supply and demand. The former has been subject to
equitable action for years, while the latter has been subject to legal
review f o r a comparatively short time, and the culmination is found in
the legislation against "unfair methods of competition", commencing
with the Sherman Anti-Trust Law,l and the interpretation thereof in
the cases of the United States v. Standard Oil Company2 and United
States v. American Tobacco Company," and ending with the passage
of the Clayton Act,* and the Federal Trade Commission Act,6 and the
interpretation thereof by many late decisions by our Supreme Court.
I t must be remembered that contracts in restraint of trade were
invalid under the common law, that "passing off" has f o r years given
a right of action, but that "unfair methods of competition", except a s
above, find their condemnation in the last two mentioned statutes.
A,s to what constitutes such methods is left finally to the Courts,B and
to the decisions we must look for our boundary lines. With the general subject of "passing off" we a r e not here interested, and with the
subject of "unfair methods of competition" we a r e only interested in
one phase thereof, that is, the fiing of resale prices-price
restriction. And, we must assume for our present purposes t h a t the legislation against restraint of trade by price restriction is based upon
~ o u n deconomic principles, and no attempt will be made to discuss that
phase of the situation. For those interested in this problem, reference is made to the admirable work of William H. S. Stevens,7 article
by Prof. Bruce Wyman,8 report of the Federal Trade Commission,
statement by Mr. Justice Brandeis" and the report of the Special
Committee of the United States Chamber of Commercelo. The economic argument i s well stated by the manufacture of trademarked
goods, t h a t the merchant buys not only the product, but buys the name

Act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. 209, Chap. 646.
221 u. S. 1
3 221 U. 3. 106
4 Act of Oct. 15, 1914, 38 Stat. 730
5 Act of Sept. 26, 1914, 38 Stat. 717
6 Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421.
7 Unfair Competition-The
University of Chicago Press
Article by Prof. Bruce W y m a n , Vol. 42, July, 1912, P a g e 69,
Annual of American .4cademy of Political Science
9 Hearings before the Committee on Interstate a n d Foreign Commerce
63rd Congress, 2nd a n d 3rd Sessions
10 A brief concerning the Maintenance of Resale Prices
1

2
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and good will, the market and waiting customers, and the manufacturer should have the right of price control, while the price cutting
merchant states that having purchased he should have the right to
resell as he pleases.
In so f a r a s we a r e now concerned the conflict is between the two
well recognized legal principles. In the case of United States v. Colgateu the Supreme Court announced that a manufacturer might legally refuse to sell his product to a dealer who cut prices t h a t the
manufacturer had previously announced a s a minimum price12. This
decision was undoubtedly based upon the fundamental principle that
so long as the title to the product remained in the manufacturer, he
could sell or refrain from selling a s he saw fit. This was but following the doctrine of the Eastern States Lumber Association v. United
Statesl-hen
i t was held that a "retail dealer has an unquestionable
right to stop dealing with a wholesaler for reasons sufficient to himself." In other words, i t is now established beyond dispute "it is the
right long recognized of a trader engaged in entirely private business
freely to exercise independent discretion a s to the parties with whom
he will deal"".
On the other hand the purchaser has the undoubted
right to sell the product he has purchased a t such price a s he sees f i t
to sell it, and the Courts have not yet held that selling a t a loss constitutes unfair competition1% The question is, where do the respective
rights and obligations begin, and where do they end?
The vitals of the decision in the Raymond Bros. case revolves
around the expression "independent discretion", and the sentence "an
act lawful when done by one may become wrongful when done by
many acting in concert, taking on the form of a conspiracy which may
be prohibited if the result be hurtful to the public or to the individual
against whom the concerted action is directed." I n other words, one
can do by himself, and independent of others, what he can not do with
others by way of conspiracy or agreement, implied or expressed. What
is this competitive conspiracy, and what limitation has i t engrafted
upon the doctrine heretofore set out? The most illuminating decision
on this subject is the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut
Packing Company1(;. That decision "required the Company to cease
and desist from carrying into effect its so-called Beech-Nut Policy by
cooperative methods in which respondent and its distributors, customers and agents undertake to prevent others from obtaining the company's products a t less than the prices designated by it-(1)
by the
practice of reporting the names of dealers who do not observe such
resale prices; (2) by causing dealers to be enrolled upon lists of undesirable purchasers who a r e not to be supplied with the products of
the company unless and until they have given satisfactory assurances
of their purpose to maintain such designated prices in the future;
(3) by employing salesmen or agents to assist in such plan by report-

U. s. 300
Frey v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U. S. 2081
234 U. S. 600
Federal Trade Commission 1.. Raymond Bros., 263 U. S. 565
16 Miles .Medicine C o . v. Park & Sons, 220 U. S. 373
16 257 U. .S. 441

11 250
12
13
14
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ing dealers who do not observe such resale prices, and giving orders
of purchase only to such jobbers and wholesalers a s sell a t the suggested prices and refusing t o give such orders to dealers who sell a t
less than such prices, or who sell t o others who sell a t less than such
prices; (4) by utilizing numbers and symbols marked upon cases
containing their products with a view of ascertaining the names of
dealers who sell the company's products a t less than the suggested
prices, or who sell to others who sell a t less than such prices in order
to prevent such dealers from obtaining the products of the company,
(5) by utilizing any other equivalent corporate means of accomplishing the maintenance of prices fixed by the company." It is well to
note t h a t the Supreme Court reversed the finding of the Circuit Court
of Appeals, but a t the same time held that the order of the Federal
Trade Commission was too broad. The Commission ordered the company t o cease and desist "refusing to sell to any such distributors because of their failure t o adhere to any such system of resale prices."
The Commission was reversed because in the opinion of t h a t Court,
while the facts appeared t o bring t h e case within the case of Miles
Medicine Company v. Park17, nevertheless i t regarded the cases a s
controlled by the decision in the case of United States v. Colgatel8.
The Supreme Court in the Beech-Nut case discusses the two last mentioned cases, and refers to its decision in the case of United States v.
Schrader's Son, 1nc.l" and says:
"In the subsequent case of United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.
S. 85, this Court had occasion to deal with a case under the Criminal Appeals
Act, wherein there was a charge that a manufacturer sold to manuhcturers
in several States under a n agreement to observe certain resale prices fixed
by the vendor,-which we held to lbe a violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
"In referring t o the Colgate case we said: 'The court below misapprehended the meaning and effect of t h e opinion and judgment in t h a t case.
We
had no intention to over-rule or modify the doctrine of Dr. Miles c medical Company v. Park & Sons Co., (220 U. S.) where the effect was to destroy the dealers'
independent discretion through restrictive agreements. Under the interpretation adopted by the trial court and necessarily accepted by us, t h e indictment failed to charge that Colgate & Company made agreements, either express or implied, which undertook to obligate vendees to observe specified
resale prices; and it was treated a s alleging only recognition of the manufacturer's undoubted right t o specify resale prices and refuse to deal with anyone
who failed t o maintain the same.'
"In the still later case of Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Company. 4 1
Sup. Ct. Rep. 451, wherein this court again had occasion to consider the subject, it was said of the previous decisions in United States v. Colgate and
United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., supra, 'Apparently the former case was
misapprehended. The latter opinion distinctly states t h a t the essential agreement, combination o r conspiracy might 'be implied from a course of dealing
or other circumstances.'
"By these decisions it is settled that in prosecutions under the Sherman
Act a trader is not guilty of violating its terms who simply refuses to sell
to others, a n d he may withhold his goods from those who will not sell them
a t the prices which he fixes for their resale. He may not, consistently with
the Act, go beyond the exercise of this right, and by contracts or combinations,
express o r implied, unduly hinder o r obstruct the free and natural flow of
commerce in the channels of interstate trade."
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It is sufficient here to add that the Supreme Court a t once upheld
the doctrine announced in the Colgate case, but a t the same time declared "from this course of conduct a court may infer * * * that
competition among retail dealers is practically suppressed * * *".
The course of conduct in the Beech-Nut case, t h a t is of interest here,
is found in paragraphs one and three of the decision, the reporting of
dealers who do not observe the resale prices. Interpretative of the
Beech-Nut decision, we have the case of Hills Bros. v. Fderal Trade
Comrnis~ion~~.
The facts disclosed that Hills Bros, announced a minimum resale plan, and learned when its minimum resale was violated
through its salesmen and from competing retail dealers located near
the dealer who was cutting the price. The Court stated the position
of Hills Bros. as follows: "This brings us to the principal contenti011
of the petitioner, namely, that i t has simply fixed a minimum resale
price for its coffee, and has refused to sell to dealers who will not
maintain the minimum price, and that in so doing i t has acted withill
its rights and kept within the law." The Court then held: "If the
petitioner has done nothing more than this, i t will be readily conceded
that the charge of unfair competition has failed." But the order to
cease and desist was granted, due to the fact that the reports were
made by salesmen and retailers. Moir v. Federal Trade Commission21
and Q . R. S. Music Company v. Federal Trade Commissionz2 follow
the above decisions. These decisions show conclusively that although
one has the right to refuse to sell and may withhold his goods from
those who will not sell them a t the prices fixed for their resale, one
can not go beyond that right, and by contracts or combinations, express or implied, unduly hinder or obstruct the free and natural flow
of commerce in the channels of interstate trade23, that one of the obstructions is a conspiracy that is created when salesmen or competitors report a violation of a minimum price policy. Has the latter
part of this conclusion been modified by other decisions, whereby
the manufacturer can use a weapon to substantiate the right given
in the former part thereof? Let us for the moment consider the case
of American Tobacco Company v. Federal Trade Commission24. 111
that case the Tobacco Company "bluntly told its jobbers that if they
were not interested in making a fair profit and for notions of their
own elected to sell a t less than a living profit, the Company would
feel a t liberty to remove them from the list of direct customers." The
Court held that such did not constitute a conspiracy. In United
States v. Hudnut 25, Judge Hand stated:
"1.t is hardly useful to review in detail the 73 casea of retailers t o whom the
defendant sold its goods, and who were c u t aff for price-cutting, and reillstated. These are 'but a small fraction of 40,000 customers. who purchased
its perfumes and toilet articles. I should not regard the suit as a reasonable
one, except for the recent case of the Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Co., 257 U. S. 441, 42 S. Ct. 150, 66 L. Ed. 307, 19 A. L. R.

20 9 F. (2) 481.
21 12 F. (2) 22
22 12 F. (2) 730
23 Colgate Case, supra.
24

26

9 F. C2) 570, Certiorari Granted, 70 L. Ed.
8 F. (2) 1010
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882, decider1 by a narrow majority. That case, however, did not hold that. a
suggestion by a. seiler t o his customer of a resale price. with a statement that
further dealings would 'be discontinued if the customer cut the suggested
~ r i c ? was
,
unlawful under the Sherman Act (Comp. St. Sec. 8820 et seq.)
I t is true that the distinction between a n agreement by word or conduct
t o maintain a reselling price on merchandise sold and delivered, and a warning that, if such a price is not maintained, future srtles will be withheld, is
delicate, and that the second may be accompanied by such circumstances a s
to show conclusively that a' contract is r-tlly made. Yet there is a difference,
and, if it is not observed, the right to refuse t o sell to a customer, who does
not by his conduct satisfy his vendor, will disappear. Certainly reckless
price-cutting cheapens a product in the eyes of the community, and often
greatly injures its future marltetability and v<due. On the whole, .there were
among the 73 cases very few instances indeed where Hudnut's salesmen,
even with the inevitable enthusiasm of such persons, did anything
like make a n agreement to fix a resale price. The facts, taken ns a whole,
more nearly resemble those in United States v. Colgate, 250 U. S. 300, 39 S.
Ct. 465, 6 3 L. Ed. 992, 7 A. R. L. 443, and Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing
CO., 256 U. S. 208, 4 1 S. Ct. 451, 65 L. Ed. 892; than those in Federal Trade
Commission v. Beech-Nut Co., supra. See, also, my opinion in Baran v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (D. C.) 256 F. 571."

In the case of Toledo Pipe-Thrashing Machine Company v. Federal Trade Commission2G, the Commissioner ordered the Machine
Company, among other things, to cease and desist (3) by informingr
dealers that price cutters reported, who would not give assurance of
adherence to the suggested resale discounts, had been or would be refused further sales; ( 4 ) by employing i t s salesmen to investigate
charges of price cutting reported by dealers. * * * The Court reversed this p a r t of the order, saying:
***"Subdivisions 2. 3, and 4 specify acts which seem to us to be of necessity reasonably incidental to the fair exerdise of this right of selection.
They represent the irreduci'ble minirxum of means by which one who adopts
the policy of not selling his goods to price cutters may endeavor to maintain
that policy, and they indicate only that inevitable degree of 'co-operation'
naturally and selfishly coming from dealers who uphold the system; and
they should not be enjoined."

The Court distinguishes the Beech-Nut case, supra, in the following manner :
"The Beech-Nut Case is not completely parallel, because in the present
case we have no system of identifying marks, and no group of salesmen or
agents engaged chiefly in finding and reporting violations, or at all in penalizing ofieders by diverting from them the retail business, nor yet the elaborate plan of 'do not sell' lists, W t h the accompanying co-operative effort to
prevent other dealers from selling to the price cutters. We do have the
general and encouraged practice by dealers to report, a s far a s they happen
to develop, .the names of price cutters and we do have the general 'practice
,of refusal by t h e manufacturer to sell to them further unless they agree to
maintain the schedule. Whether these things amount to such 'co-operative
methods' between the manufacturer and the dealers a s the court refers to i.n
the Beech-Nut Case, or a r e merely a refusal to sell to price cutters, enforced
by what so far a s has been pointed out is the only available method, is not
clear."

It is also interesting to note what is said of the American Tobacco Case, supra, and the Hills Bros. Case, supra;
"The two recent price-maintenance cases in t h e Second and Ninth Circuit
Courts of Appeals (American Tobacco CO. v. F. T. C . . 9 F. (2) 570, Oct. 20.
1925, and Hills Bros. v. F. T. C., 9 F. (2d) 481, January 4, 1926), although
distinguishable in details, appear to u s fundamentally in conflict with each
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other. I t would seem t h a t the Tobacco Company and t h e Wholesale Association exercised a. concert of action ,to constrain t h e price cutters, a t leart
as much as did t h e petitioner, t h e Toledo Company, a n d its distributors in
the present case. T h e discuss:on by J u d g e Rogers of t h e controlling decisions
and principles would support the conclusion t h a t t h e practices of t h e Toledo
Company a r e lau3ul. I n the Hills Bros. Case, t h e co-opclation between petitioner and l t s customers was no more in kind, though probably g r e a t e r in
nmount, than we have here, and the opinion of Judge Rudkin concludes t h a t
this kind of co-oyeration is t h e thing forbidden by t h e rule of the Beech-Nut
Case."

And, but recently t h e Circuit Court of Appeals in t h e case of
Cream of Wheat Company v. Federal T r a d e Commission27 amended
the order of t h e Commission on objection made t o paragraphs 2 ( a )
and (b), and paragraphs 4 a n d 6 . T h e Court s t a t i n g t h e proposition,
as follows:
"The objections t o paragraph 2 (a) a r e t h a t t h e petitioner construes It
as directing petitioner to desist from securing f r o m customers or prospective
customers or from dealers o r trade associations reports of customers, who
fail to observe its resale prices.
"But t h e order does not w a r r a n t such a n interpretation. T h e language
Is to desist from "soliciting a n d securing" from customers, etc., s u c h information. uMerely securing t h e information is not prohibited, unless t h e information is also "solicited." If t h e order had employed t h e disjunctive "or"
instead of the conjunctive "and," consel's contention would be entitled t o
greater consideration, a question not before u s a n d not decided.
"This order does not prohibit t h e petitioner from acting on information
received by it without solicitation, b u t communicated t o it voluntarily b y
some of its custome~ss, o r from advertisements of price cuttings. This also
~ p p l i e sto t h e objections to paragraph 2 (b).
"Paragraph 4 only requires t h e petitioner to desist from "employing its
sales agents to assist in such plan 'by reporting dealers who have failed t o
observe its resale prices, *** a n d furnishing said agenLs the names of customers to whom i t has refused f u r t h e r sales because of price cutting, a n d
instructing them not t o sell to such customers." T h e words "to assist" i n
such plans m u s t b e construed iln connection with p a r a g r a p h s 2 (a) a n d 2 (b)
"to solicit and secure," a n d is limited to information solicited a n d secured
from customers, etc., t h e names of customers guilty of price cutting or in
other words t h e y m u s t not solicit customers to furnish them with information
of those cutting prices of the articles manufactured a n d sold to t h e trade by
the petitioner, a n d act o n information t h u s obtained."

And finally, the case of Ayer v. Federal T r a d e C o m m i s ~ i o n * ~ :
"As long a s t h e manufacturer does not monopolize his line of PI-oducts
and use unfair or fraudulent methods, he should be permitted to exercke the
privilege which t h e law accords him of selecting his customers a n d refusing
to sell to customers who undermine t h e mavket by becoming price cutters.
***No court h a s gone so f a r a s to hold t h a t a n occasional instance in the l)u#iness career of a firm as where a n a g e n t h a s solicited or urged a retailer not
to cut prices, amounts t o a n unfair \business policy o r const6tutes a method
of merchandising which ifi condemned 'by t h e act. * * * I t ( t h e respondent)
had about eight thousand customers, a n d there w e r e not more t h a n fifty
complaints of customers a s price cutters. I t did not seek o u t such price cutters but from time to time t h e y were reported by comgetitors in t h e johbing
and retail business. ***Very rarely %vas a n investigation made by a salesman or representative of t h e petitioner (the respondent). I t had 'hut nine
Salesmen in its large business. No list of price c u t t e r s w a s kept, no system
of follow-ups was pursued a f t e r the form letter I ~ sSe n t out, a n d there w a s
no estnbltished method of interviewing or keeping in touch with t h e retailer o r
jobber. *** Therc was no cooperation w i t h i t s jobbers a n d retailers or other distributors which w a s effectual either as a n agreement, expressed or implied, intended to accomplish purposes of price fixing."
27 C. C. A. 8th Circuit, decided J u l y 26, 1926.
2s C,

C. C. 2nd Circuit
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These cases again substantiate the proposition t h a t one has the
right t o select his customers, they also go t o the extent of holding t h a t
a manufacturer can suggest t o his customers t h a t he will be discontinued unless a resale price is maintained, and t h a t reports can be
used to maintain the right of selection, t h a t is, can secure the information without solicitation.
Truly Judge Denison was correct when he stated "The state of
the law a s t o price maintenance may rightfully be said to be in
conf usi0n".2~
The question t h a t seems to be open is, does the Beech-Nut Case
hold t h a t the mere reporting of price cutting by competition and or
salesman is a conspiracy that constitutes "unfair methods of competition"? If i t does, the decisions a r e in hopeless conflict, and t h a t the
right of selection of one's customers is t o a great extent nullified; if,
on the other hand, such does not constitute a conspiracy, the decisions can be reconciled.
The basis of a conspiracy is a combination o r agreement, expressed o r implied. Can i t be said because a manufacturer announces
a minimum resale problem, then receives information from a competitor of the person cutting prices, and cuts that person from his list,
t h a t such constitutes a combination or agreement in restraint of
trade? Does such constitute a conspiracy? I t would certainly appear t h a t such does not constitute a n agreement. Another question
might arise if under the given circumstances the price cutter should
be cut off f o r price cutting and then restored upon a n agreement not
to again cut prices. But this is an agreement and not a conspiracy.
HAROLD
HIRSCH,'01.
of Candler, Thomson & Hirsch,
Atlanta, Georgia.
29

Toledo Case, supra.
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The Courts and the People
BY
GEO. F. GOBER
Our constitution provides:-All
government o r right originates
with the people, i s founded on t h e i r will only a n d i s instituted
solely for the good of t h e whole. Public officers a r e t h e trustees
and servants of t h e people a n d a t all times answerable to them. I t
further assures t h e right of freedom of speech. We could not afford to detract from t h e g r e a t importance of these constitutional
safeguards; they a r e necessary to preserve our liberties under o u r
form of government. We have also t h e slogan t h a t o u r s i s a government by the people, f o r t h e people, which i s brought f o r t h a n d
made to do duty i n many political contests. These a r e t h e texts
of every demagogue seeking office upon which he rings t h e changes
when he presents himself with a patriotic a i r a n d saintly pose asking the electroate to support him. H e i s either a reformer o r iconoclast as his exigencies demand. Ignorant of t h e past a n d with no
care for the future h e paints a glorious rainbow of f u t u r e prosperity provided he be elected. H e would t e a r down old institutions f o r
the sake of the space; a n iconoclast never builds; he conceives his
mission is to destroy regardless of value a n d intrinsic worth. Like
a chameleon he takes on the cloro of his surroundings. If he offers
a remedy i t i s usually empirical and untried. H e promises many
things impossible but anything t o catch his hearers. To listen to
him, the Government i s all wrong f r o m t o p to bottom; officers a r e
not doing their duty; g r a f t controls a n d t h e jails and penitentiaries
ought to be enlarged to accommodate t h e delinquents. As a rule
he is not taken seriously a n d like a storm soon blows over. Some
demagogues write and others speak.
The people rule and by majorities control. They, through their
representatives framed our constitutions and ratified them. We live
under a dual government; each one within i t s powers i s sovereign.
The people elect the congress, the legislature and the executive officers. They elect the judges, the solicitors general and the clerks and
Sheriffs of the courts. Each one of these officers exercises delegated power given by the people; they a r e told by the laws where
their authority begins and where i t ends; what they can do and what
they cannot do; their duties and obligations a r e specifically defined.
Every officer in this State must be able t o point t o some law t h a t
gives him the official authority t h a t he assumes t o exercise.
The people making the laws and, electing the officers, they a r e
responsible for the courts. The Grand jurors and the traverse jurors are part of the people; the people furnish thd litigants and the
witnesses;-they furnish t h e criminals. It must be concluded t h a t
we live under a pure democracy and the people rule.
Every citizen having a p a r t in the government is privileged to
criticise any officer and every official act not in conformity with the
delegated power. Such criticism when f a i r i s a patriotic duty. If
any officer betrays his t r u s t or any department of the government
be not properly carried on, f a i r criticism would call attention to the
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fact and i t would be remedied; if there be nothing wrong, confidence
would be restored which is of greatest importance to any officer or
department of government.
There has been much said and written about a wave of crime.
T h a t there have been many violations of t h e criminal law cannot be
denied. It is not local. This condition exists from one ocean to the
other; from Canada to the gulf; i t has been magnified and held up
a s something for which the courts were responsible. I t has been a
great theme for demagogues. A physician when called to treat a patient first makes a diagnosis of the trouble; he determines what
treatment is necessary and then from his professional knowledge he
applies the remedy.
We have more people in the United States than we ever had. I t
is estimated we have a population of about 120,000,000. This is a
great population, a s many as Rome ever had in the time of her greatest power. As a result we have more criminals-a
greater variety of
criminals. We have more money and property than ever before and
more opportunity and inducement to steal. We have a large number
who want to enjoy the luxuries the age affords and to do so without
work. Clothes and high living, expensive hotels and bootleg liquor
cannot be enjoyed whhout money and, criminals habituated to these
things, feel that they must have them either one way or another. On
this account we have mail robberies, burglaries and bank robberies
often with murders attending to accomplish the purposes. If there
be a wave of these crimes courts can no more ward i t off than can
physicians ward off a scourge of the plague. A court cannot move
itself; the people must move i t through indictments and the furnishing of the evidence. This is the work of the people through their selected officers. A judge is not a court anymore than a court is a judge.
A court is a place where justice is judicially administered. A court
is the assembling of the proper officers a t a particular time and place
fixed by law t o dispose of t h e business properly before it.
Every important criminal case in the world today is broadcasted
by the daily papers throughout the land. The newspapers a r e not t a
blame for this since they print what the people want to read. Gerald Chapman, Dutch Anderson, Whittemore and many others have
been on the front page during the last year with their pictures and
doings as wonderful examples of the product of the criminal class;
also the Hall case in New Jersey where i t is charged a preacher and
his female choir leader caught in flagrante delicto were murdered.
The law abiding people reading about these things can well conclude
that there is a wave of crime.
In our diagnosis let us see further. We have more laws than
we have ever had; more statutes to be enforced. In thirty-nine
states last year thirteen thousand laws were passed. Ignorance of
law excuses no one and the very minute each one of these was approved by the Governor everybody was presumed to know them and
held to be accountable for their violations. Many of these laws were
necessary to prescribe the rights and obligations arising under our
progress and complicated civilization. The automobile, the aeroplane,
the radio and other things have required new statutes but many
were the result of propaganda of one-eyed fanatics seeking to govern
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the people by criminal statutes. Criminal statutes a r e important
and necessary f o r reasonable needs but no government can o r ever
has ruled a people by drastic criminal statutes and penalties. Henry
VIII reigned thirty-six years and under his laws seventy-two thousand during his reign were executed for theft and burglary. I t was
a capital offense to steal as much as twelve and one-half pence about
twenty-five cents. There were many other trifling offenses punished with death. He was followed by Mary who burned about two
hundred a t the stake as heretics and non-confomists. Blackstone
wrote his commentaries in 1765 and a t that time there were in
England one hundred sixty felonies punishable by death. There a r e
only two now. I n America, during t h e administration of John Adams
the Alien and Sedition laws were passed. Under these laws i t was
said one could not criticise the cut of a Congressman's coat without
violating the law. There were many convictions and on account of
these laws and the party of Adams. was driven from power and the
laws repealed. Jefferson went out of power rendered unpopular by
the Embargo law, which was defied and repealed. Public sentiment
was not in favor of the law for t h e reason t h a t i t was unreasonable
and deprived the citizens of fundamental rights.
The judge under our system in misdemeanor cases has a wide
discretion in the imposing of penalties. There a r e some that assume
to think that a judge is not doing his duty unless he imposes maximum
penalties in every case. Ignorant of every principle of penology they
set themselves up a s critics over him. Some have gone so f a r a s to
publish a list of his penalties with criticisms. It would be a disgrace to the State if i t had even one judge who could be intimidated
from his duty under his oath of office by such contemptible doings.
Any one ought to know there is a difference in cases, in the circumstances, in the defendants and their ability to pay, in their records
and even where two defendants have violated the same criminal
statute, circumstances often make a difference in their proper penalties.
The question comes, if the laws and procedure are wrong what
remedies and changes should be made to better conditions? The
demagogue attacks the present status but he does not offer any plan
or suggestions for betterment. Would he abolish the jury system
and would such a remedy be successful? This system has been imbedded in the laws of the English speaking people for a thousand
years; it has been tried out and found t o be the greatest protection
yet found for the rights and liberties of the citizen against arbitrary
and irresponsible power; i t is firmly fixed in our Constitution; to
take away this right would be revolutionary and no thinking man
would countenance such an undertaking. The protagonist would find
it impossible. A defendant under our law is presumed t o be innocent until the contrary is made to appear by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Would the reformer change this rule and set up that
a defendant is presumed to be guilty when brought before the court
on a criminal charge and put the burden on him t o show his innocence to the satisfaction of the courb? Such a proposition is ridiculous and to state i t is to argue its absurdity. Would the reformer
insist a defendant should not have a fair trial conducted under the

18

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

form of law? If such be his remedial change there is no room f o r
further argument. If such changes were made we might a s well
abolish the courts and live in a state of anarchy. Life, liberty, and
property would have no protection; physical might would be the measure of right and chaos would reign supreme. Such changes a r e unthinkable and no sane man would consider such propositions f o r a
moment.
If our legal machinery i s not doing i t s proper work we should
remedy it. The law should be properly enforced but one who would
criticize i t should be able t o point out the trouble, t o show where the
defects a r e and let improvements be made. This duty is upon the
people through their representatives in the law making body. The
judges and Solicitors General do not belong to the criminal class;
none of them have been indicted and convicted of violations of any
criminal law. On the contrary Georgia has a s honest, able and hardworking judiciary a s she ever had; a s fearless a s ever before in the
enforcement of the law. This may be said of the judges in all the
courts from the highest t o the lowest. The people know the hard
work the circuit judges a r e compelled to do to dispose of the business;
they work early and late often under disadvantageous conditions.
The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court a r e made up of justices
whose ability and high professional character a r e equal to t h a t of any
who have ever presided in those courts. They work harder f o r the
money they get than do any other officers in the State.
In the last fifty years only two justices of the Supreme court
have been defeated f o r reelection. This was not on account of their
lack of ability a s lawyers nor on account of their wanting in character a s men but their successors were easily the peers in character
and ability of any justices who had ever served in t h a t court. The
members of the Court of Appeals have each served f o r a long time
and have shown by their work their great ability and appreciation.
From these facts, with the power of the people a t each recurring
election to change the personnel of the courts, i t may be safely assumed t h a t the people a r e satisfied with their work. Many of our
Superior Court judges have occupied the bench from twenty to thirty
years. Their work i s done in the open; the public has a right to be
present a s it usually i s and to see how the business is transacted and
how the law is enforced. If the Judges had failed in administering
even handed justice they would have been quickly retired. A judge
in a circuit in Georgia who occupies the bench f o r ten years if he has
not maintained a character for uprightness and f a i r dealing would be
beaten in an election before the people by the litigants against whom
he had decided cases and the criminals he had sentenced if they did
not respect him.
The lawyer has been prominent from the time of the colonies
up to the present. He has done his p a r t in civic affairs. He gave
to the struggling colonies his advice and help. Lawyers wrote the
Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation.
They framed the Constitution of the United States and wrote the
constitutions of the 48 states of the Union. They have helped to
make the laws and have stood up against every effort to invade the
rights and liberties of the people. Loyal to their profession and its
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history and traditions the lawyers have always exhibited a conscen811s of opinion and a brotherhood in effort against innovations and
radicalism
There has never been a time in the history of this country when
there was a greater responsibility upon the legal profession than a t
the present.
During the f i r s t development of the country there were few public question upon which there was not a n agreement of opinion. One
was the protection of the colonies from the aborigenes; the other
was the securing of their rights from England. There was little
room for division. The great business of the f i r s t colonies along
with these things was agriculture, the cutting away of the forests
and the development of the country. There were no great interests
claiming advantages in their favor; there were none of the troublesome matters that have since arisen; there was no race question and
the population of the different colonies were not split up into factions
over local questions. It is different to-day; there i s the great question as to whether the American people can govern themselves and
perpetuate their government. As soon a s the Constitution framed
by our forefathers is thrown aside or emasculated the end will come
in chaos and confusion.
We speak of the traditions of the professions. To some t h e
name is indefinite and uncertain. These a r e not defined i n t h e
Code. We do not find the law of gravitation nor any of the unalterable laws of chemistry in the Code nor in the Ten Commandments, but this does not deny their existence. Some think
that one is a good citizen who keeps out of the criminal
court and is not sent t o jail.
F o r one t o perform his
civic obligations, to be on the side of right against wrong, to regard
the unwritten moral laws, and to do unto others a s he would have
them do unto him, i s to fulfil the duties of a good citizen and this
name is reserved f o r such a member of a community. T h e traditions
of the legal profession a r e the unwritten laws over and above the
stringent regulations laid down in the code t h a t apply to the lawyers; they have been developed out of necessity from the relation t h a t
the bar sustains t o the people and the courts. This is a fiduciary relation involving t r u s t and confidence and faith in loyal devotion.
They spring from the obligation of the B a r in the administration of
the law. The lawyer who does not live up to them will fall short of
success and fail in his professional career.
It is demanded t h a t the highest standard of courtesy and integrity shall be maintained and the work of the Courts and B a r shall
show an endeavor to give to every one his due.
In the decisions of our higher Courts from their establishment
till now, presided over by learned Judges, there may be found written and between the lines unwritten many of the traditions of the
profession. These things show the heart and soul of the men who
wrote the opinions and a loyalty and appreciation of the proper
standard of professional obligation and responsibility. There have
been Judges of the Superior Court now dead and gone whose memories
are cherished and whose administrations a r e remembered from the
impartial manner in which they meted out justice. The same can be
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said of Judges now in commission. The lawyer who acting within the
written law does not regard the traditions of the profession to pursue
a f a i r and honorable course of professional conduct is condemned by
his fellows and will lose much by any, success achieved in such way.

Rufus Choate at one time a United States Senator and the greatest trial lawyer this country ever produced said:
"The necessity of the legal profession to the machinery of the
social fabric in a free State is undeniable, and all history shows that
popular liberty is best preserved, advanced and defended, where the
legal profession is most unrestricted and free. There is, and there
has been, no free profession in a despotism. When a celebrated Emperor of Russia was in England, he expressed the utmost astonishment a t the consideration in which the legal profession was there
held. He declared that there never was but one lawyer in his dominions, and he had caused him to be hung. And well he might, for
such a man would be much in the way of the arbitrary proceedings in
a despotic country. And even in free and enlightened governments,
the popular excitement against private individuals, who happen to incur popular odium, is a dangerous element, which requires some
check in the machinery of society itself, or great wrongs will often
be done. When popular excitement is a t the highest point-when
popular clamor is loudest, and a victim is absolutely demanded, and
seems necessary for peace, i t is no small safety for every member of
the community to have a class of men educated and trained for the
purpose of defending those who can not defend themselves, to step
forth a s the advocate, if not the friend, of those who are hunted by
popular clamor, to give their time, their talents, their learning and
their skill in defense of those whom all others desert-to breast the
f u r y of the people-to stem the popular current-and
to insist upon
a full, f a i r and impartial investigation before the victim is offered up.
And when we reflect that men have been convicted and have suffered
the extreme penalty of the law, whose innocence was afterwards made
manifest to the world; that men have sometimes confessed themselves guilty of crimes of which they were entirely innocent, we shall
see more clearly the need of a legal profession, and shall be more cautious of condemning those who enter into their duties with zeal and
energy and enthusiasm-who mean to do their whole duty irrespective
of the applause or clamor of the public while laboring under tempora r e excitement."-Reminiscences.
Of Rufus Choate his biographer said :"His manner to the judge was always in the highest degree deferential. I t was almost filial. He had a feeling of poetic veneration
for the judge, as the titular sovereign of that forensic scene which
was the theatre of his love a s well a s of his labors. How splendid a
character and how august a figure was his ideal of the judge, appears
in the word-picture of such a magistrate, which he drew in his great
speech in the Massachusetts Convention against an elective judiciary.
He said every judge should have something of the venerable and illustrious attach to his character and function in the feelings of men;
and he went on to observe: 'the good judge should be profoundly
learned in all the learning of the law, and he must know how to use
that learning. Will any one stand up here to deny this? In this
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day, boastful, glorious f o r its advancing popular, professional, scientific, and all education, will any one disgrace himself by doubting the
necessity of deep and continued studies, and various and thorough
attainments, to the bench? He is to know not merely the law which
YOU make and the legislature makes, not constitutional and statute
law alone, but t h a t other, ampler, t h a t boundless jurisprudence, t h e
common law, which the successive generations of the State have silently built up; t h a t old code of freedom which we brought with us
in the Mayflower and Arabella, but which in the progress of centuries
we have ameliorated and enriched and adapted wisely t o t h e necessities of a busy, prosperous and wealthy community,-that
he must
know. And where to find i t ? I n volumes which you must count by
hundreds, by thousands ; filling libraries ; exacting long labors ; the
labors of a lifetime, abstracted from business, from politics; but assisted by taking p a r t in an active judicial administration; such labors
as produced the wisdom and won the fame of Parsons, and Marshall,
and Kent, and Story, and Holt, and Mansfield. If your systern of
appointment and tenure does not present a motive, a help f o r such
labors and such learning; if i t discourages, if i t disparages them, in
so far it is a failure.
'In the next place, he must be a man, not merely upright, not
merely honest and well-intentioned-this
of course-but
a man who
will not respect persons in judgment. And does not every one here
agree to this also? Dismissing, for a moment, all theories about the
mode of appointing him, or the time f o r which he shall hold office,
sure I am, we all demand, t h a t a s f a r a s human virtue, assisted by
the best contrivances of human wisdom, can attain to it, he shall
not respect persons in judgment. He shall know nothing about the
parties, everything about t h e case. H e shall do everything f o r justice, nothing for himself, nothing f o r his friend, nothing for his patron, nothing for his sovereign. If on the one side is the executive
power, and the legislature, and the people-the sources of his honor,
the givers of his daily bread-and
on the other, an individual nameless and odious, his eye i s t o see neither great nor small; a t t e n d i n ~
only to the 'trepidations of t h e balance.' If a law is passed by a unanimous legislature, clamored f o r by the general voice of the public,
and a cause is before him on i t in which the whole community is on
one side and an individual nameless or odious on the other, and he
believes i t to be against t h e Constitution, he must so declare it, or
there is no judge. If Athens comes there to demand t h a t the cup of
hemlock be put to the lips of the wisest of men, and he believes t h a t
he has not corrupted the youth, nor omitted t o worship the gods of
the city, nor introduced new divinities of his own, he must deliver
him, though the thunder light on t h e unterrified brow."
Coleridge says, "Strength may be met with strength: the power
of inflicting pain may be baffed by the pride of endurance: the eye
of rage may be answered by the stare of defiance, or the downcast
look of dark and revengeful resolve: and with all this there i s a n
outward and determined object to which the mind can attach its passions and purposes, and bury its own disquietudes in the full occupation of the senses. But who dares struggle with a n invisible combatant, with an enemy which exists and makes us know its existence,
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but where i t is we ask in vain? No space contains it, time promises
no control over it, i t has no ear for my threats, i t has no substance
that my hands can grasp or my weapons find vulnerable; i t commands
and cannot be commanded, i t acts and is insusceptible of my reaction,
the more I strive to subje it, the more am I compelled to think of it,
and, the more I think of it, the more do I find i t to possess a reality
out of myself, and not to be a phantom of my own imagination;that all but the most abandoned men acknowledge its authority, and
that the whole strength and majesty of my country are pledged to
support i t ; and yet that for me its power is the same with that of my
own permanent self, and that all the choice which is permitted to me
consists in having i t for my guardian angel or my avenging fiend.
This is the spirit of LAW,-the
lute of Amphion,-the
harp of
Orpheus. This is the true necessity which compels man into the
social state, now and always, by a still beginning, never ceasing, force
of moral cohesion."
If there be on earth a people who think less of justice and liberty
than the laborer does of his harvest, or the workman of his daily
bread, or the merchant of his wealth, or the mariner of his repose,
or the soldier of his glory :-build
around that people a high wall,
that their breath may not infect the rest of the world.
And t h a t people who are rising above mere material good, have
placed their affections on the true good; who, to obtain that true
good, have spared no labor, no fatigue, no sacrifice, shall hear this
word: "For those who have a soul, there is the recompense of souls.
Because thou hast loved justice and liberty before all things, come
and possess forever liberty and justice."-From
Words of a Believer.
Our Constitution in the preamble provides that i t is established
"To perpetuate the principles of free government, to insure justice
to all, promote the interest and happiness of the citizen and transmit
to posterity the enjoyment of liberty." To this end laws are framed
and the courts are provided to enforce the laws. The criminal who
violates the laws is an enemy of government; he defies i t for his
personal and selfish aims. The courts are all the protection tlie people have and it is true patriotism for the citizen to sustain them with
all his help. A small portion of the population is ever in the criminal
courts-less
than one per cent. The people must depend upon the
courts for personal liberty, personal security and the protection of
private property. Courts should maintain the confidence of the people by carrying out the spirit of the laws. I t does not help to criticise them unjustly, to hold them in disrespect and disparage their
efforts to carry their burden. The greatest boon to all is liberty
for which the people must depend upon the laws. The Supreme Court
of the United States in 262 U. S. 390 in the case of Meyer vs. Nebraska
said :
"The liberty of all persons without doubt denotes not merely
freedom from bodily restraint, but also the right of the individual
to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to
acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law a s essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
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freemen."
The Constitution guarantees all of these fundamental rights.
They have been vindicated in many decided c a s e s It i s not strange
that criminal laws should be broken. This was expected when they
were passed; otherwise there would have been no provision f o r punishment. There has never been a law t h a t has not been violated, nor
a statute but by some i t was disregarded. This is t r u e of the "Thou
shalt nots" of the Decalogue t h a t was given t o us by the Great Jehovah; some people act a s if these were negligible and not binding.
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Home Rule for Home Affairs
(Advocating a Constitutional limitation on the Legislative
power to interfere i n the municipal control of matters of
local concern).
(Joseph M. Jones-A.

B. Univ. of Ga.; L1. B., Harvard.)

In taking up a matter of such vital importance to the welfare of
the American municipalities, i t is not amiss to delve, somewhat briefly, into t h e historical development of the alleged Home Rule doctrine.
At a general rule, the citizens of our country are wont to justify their
fundamental and almost inherent rights of local self government, religious freedom, and personal equality on vague generalities, as were
outlined in the Magna Charta, and successive Bills of Rights, with
which our ancestors were so fervently imbued when they first reached these shores.
This is all very well, but i t seems much more desirable to have
the whole matter settled once and for all, in so f a r a s i t can be settled
without court action, by inserting a clause in the State Constitution
expressly providing for a t least a limited local self-government for
the municipalities, in matters of local concern. But this argument
runs counter to the time-worn, over-emphasized idea that the Legislature can exercise a free hand in the regulation and control of the
municipalities, since the latter are only created arms of the State.
I i t i s often said with laconic emphasis, that the "Legislature is allpowerful-the Legislature created the municipal corporation and can
destroy it, so the Legislature must have the absolute control, and if
i t wishes to exercise such control i t may do so, unhampered by any
court action." But in dissolving a Municipal Corporation the Legislature is limited by Constitutional provisions, prohibiting the impairment of contracts and the deprivation of property without due process of law. Then why can we not say that the Legislative power
of control over Municipal Corporations is subject to, and limited by,
the. Constitutional privilege of local self government in affairs having
no direct relation to outsiders or outside activities. But, since there
is great uncertainty as to whether the courts will recognize this Constitutional privilege a s being an inherent right in the American people (though some half dozen states have so recognized i t ) , i t is highly desirable to so amend the State Constitution a s to insure protection from arbitrary interference on the part of the Legislature. In
advocating such a Constitutional limitation we must determine- ( I ) ,
if such is in keeping with the historical development of the Municipal
Corporation; ( 2 ) , if there is a logical basis for such a distinction; and
(3), if such action can be justified from a legal viewpoint.
First a s to the historical development: When our ancestors first
came to settle this country, they brought with them ideas of liberty
and polity, and left a t home all the undesirable and oppressing principles of the Royal Government. On reaching these wild and undeveloped regions they found a field of unexampled extent, for the free
development of such ideas. Accordingly, the system of intrusting the
direction of local affairs to local constituencies has from the earliest
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colonial periods, been developed by us to a much greater extent than
in England. As you pass from one section of this country t o the other, alike in the older regions a s in the newest organized settlements,
you find the affairs of each road district, school district, county or
town, locally self managed, including t h e administration of Justice.
Every county has a local court with full power t o summons a jury of
the vicinity, thereby bringing Justice home to the business and bosoms
of the people, and making i t their own affair.
Each State binds together the local institutions which i t creates
and regulates, independently of Federal control; thus happily preventing an undue concentration of the power and duty of regulating
the affairs of the local communities, throughout a country of such extent that with its needs and interests i t would be impossible f o r Congress to become adequately acquainted. The number and general
freedom of the Municipal Corporations invested with power t o decide
and control local and subordinate matters, pertaining solely to their
respective communities, constitutes a marked feature in our system
of Government They a r e simply t h e administrative form of the
fundamental idea of American Government, viz, t h a t the people a r e
the source of all political powers, and have the right to exercise them.
When our forefathers left their homes to brave the storms and
ravages of this country, they came with definite notions of freedom,
both in home and public life. They brought with them t h e forms of
local organization, involving the right to local self government, and
dating back to the time of the Saxon who invaded England, divided
the country into civil divisions, and instilled in the people their f i r s t
principles of civic patriotism.
The Constitutions of the States were adopted a t a time when this
form of local self government was uniformly recognized, and i t can
be argued with considerable force, t h a t in a s much a s this right was
recognized as being vested in, exercised and enjoyed by, the people of
the respective communities, i t remained in them unless expressly yielded up and granted to one of the departments of the State by t h e
terms of the Constitution. (This argument is chiefly emphasized by
those few theorists who claim t h a t the State Constitution, like the
Federal, is to be regarded a s a mere g r a n t of powers by the people,
who still remain all-powerful except where expressly placed under
Legislative control). With this argument in mind, the courts of
Michigan, Indiana and Kentucky, have held t h a t the people have a n
inherent right to local self-government in regard to matters of local
concern, and have read such ideas into t h e Constitutions. It seems
more desirable, however, and a t least more certain, t o follow the notable example of New York, in assuring such right to t h e people by a
constitutional amendment, which expressly provides t h a t every municipal officer, whose election or appointment is not provided f o r in
the Constitution, shall be elected by t h e Electors of the Municipality,
or of some division there of. This i s only a modified form of Home
Rule. Most of the Constitutional provisions go the full length and
allow local self-government in all matters of purely local concern.
Then i t seems clear t h a t the adoption of such a n amendment t o
the Constitution is in keeping with the historical development of the
hiunicipality-in fact some of our states have recognized the doctrine
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without any express Constitutional provision.
Second, a s to whether there is a logical and common sense basis
to such action in distinguishing between matters of local and of public concern in this connection: Before trying to answer such a question, we should f i r s t closely examine the whole subject to determine
if possible, where and how this distinction i s to be made-where the
dividing line is to be drawn, and what activities are to be classed as
public and what as local. The uncertainty of results, based on the
mass of inconsistent decisions, force us to leave the court as the final
oracle of wisdom, except for a few outstanding activities. We might
say that the powers of the Municipality, which relate t o the health,
good government, and efficient police, in which all citizens have an
equal interest, are of public concern. While those which directly involve the expenditure of money, and especially those relating to the
various local improvements, the expense of which ultimately falls on
the local property owners, are to be regarded as of purely local concern, and in respect to these the controlling voice ought t o be with
those who must bear the burden. This seems to be logical enough;
in fact i t would seem wholly inconsistent with the fundamental ideals
of American Government to hold otherwise. Our forefathers rose in
arms when the mother country tried to impose burdens on them
when they had no control over the assessment of such burdens. Why
should the people in a remote part of the State be allowed, through
their Representatives in t h e Legislature, to assess owners of distant
city property large sums of money to help pay for a Municipal P a r k ?
Why should the political party in control of Legislature be allowed
to send their supporter down t o control the water plant of a city in
which the said supporter was wholly disinterested, save to fill his
purse with the city's money?
No Municipal Management will, i n the long run, be other than
extravagant and unwise, where members of the Governing body have
no substantial interests in the welfare of the community, and where
they have more to gain by plundering than protecting it. To insure
good Government there must be a real identity of interest between
the members of the Governing Board and the Community. A system
of popular municipal organization and local administration is undoubtedly the fairest to the individual citizen. Any other conclusion
would be equivalent to an admission that the people in this country
a r e incapable of enlightened self-government, in regard to matters
of local concern, and that the few ought to govern the many. Thus
i t seems that this doctrine of local self-government in regard to matters of local concern, is not only logical in its distinction, but reasonably justified on grounds of fairness and expediency. Then since
local matters can better be regulated by the people of the locality
than by the central powers, we should provide in our Constitutions
that each city shall, as to its local matters, be self-governing. Not
only is the doctrine of local self-government wholly logical and fair,
but to deny i t seems dangerous to the stability of our political instituions.
Under color of Legislative control, politicians, Legislators ignorant of Constitutional law, if no worse is to be said of them, and
Judges accepting the doctrine without adequate study of the history
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and development of the American Colonies, are unconsciously cooperating to deprive our towns and cities of their right to self-government in their local affairs.
It is further to be noted that Legislators are prompted to interfere with local self-government as a general rule, only when the dominating political machinery of their party is losing its control in the
particular city sought thus to be brought into subjection. Legislature always purports to be acting in the interest of sound morality,
on the ground that the inhabitants have shown themselves incompetent to manage their own affairs; but this system of paternalism, of
government by an outside body, which was the essence of the Roman
system of governing the colonies by Prefects, always works to the injury of the community.
The case of State v. Smith, 44 Ohio St. 348, might be given a t
this point, as a notable example of the attitude of the courts on this
matter. The members of the local Boards, under the Act there in
question, were to be appointed by the Governor, though the duties of
the officers were clearly local, i. e., "to supervise the cleaning and improving of the streets, wharves, markets, and the sewers of the city."
Each officer way to receive $4,000 a year, a rather high price in those
days, certainly high enough t o make the Act a desirable one for the
party in power, that i t might have some nice f a t "plums", with which
to reward its henchmen, free from control by the local community.
Owen, C. J., in a vigorous dissent a t page 382, characterizes the Act
as "a scheme of conspiracy and fraud, unparallelled in the history of
the Legislature." Even i n the opinion of the Majority of the Court
admitted the character of the Act when i t said, a t page 374: "Over
the wisdom or policy of this Legislature this court has no control,"
citing the language used in Sharpless V. Mayor, 21 Pa. St. 162: "There
is no shadow of reason for the supposition that the mere abuse of
power was meant to be corrected by the Judiciary. The remedy in
such cases is with the people."
As to the Georgia law on this point, the case of Mayor of Americus v. Perry, 114 Ga. 871 seems t o be outstanding, where Judge Cobb
laid down the rule that, "There is nothing in the Constitution of this
state which guarantees to the people living within the limits of a
municipal corporation the absolute right of local self-government.
How far people so situated may be allowed to participate in the choice
of officers who are to administer the affairs of the local government
is a matter exclusively within the judgment and discretion of the General Assembly. The power to appoint public officers is not purely a n
executive function, but this power may be exercised by the General
Assembly, when not otherwise provided in the constitution, either by
naming a given person for the office, o r providing the manner in
which the officer shall be chosen; and the General Assembly also has
the authority to provide for the appointment of a number of officers
to discharge a given duty, and provide that vacancies in such number
may be filled by those remaining in office, thus creating a self-perpetuating body."
In the early case of Churchill v. Walker, 68 Ga. 681, Judge Speer
held an Act of the Legislature constitutional, where i t subjected the
town of Darien to the control of the commissioners of the county in
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which i t was situated, merely stating that "All acts of the legislature
are presumably valid and constitutional, and this is conclusive unless
i t can be shown that the act is prohibited by the constitution."
Thus i t seems that the courts of this state have reluctantly upheld
such interferences, leaving i t to the people to remedy the situation
by a constitutional amendment.
Then, if the courts are to be so technical in their decisions, and
so strict in their interpretation of the Constitution, i t is for the
people to step forward and demand an Amendment to the Constitution, expressly limiting this arbitrary power of the Legislature.
The fact that the Municipal Corporation is liable for its Torts,
committed in the exercise of the private or business functions, seems
to furnish another logical basis for distinguishing between matters
of public and of local concern, though the terms private and local are
not entirely synonymous. If a Municipal Corporation is to be held
liable for the negligent acts of the Water Plant Commissioner or the
Wharf Commissioner, then i t seems only fair that i t should be allowed the exclusive privilege of selecting such agents. Of course, if the
city, acting in its capacity a s an arm of the State, enjoys the privilege and immunities of the State a s in police powers, then i t is only
natural for the State to assert control over such officers. I n the former case the city seems t o be acting just like a private corporation,
or private citizen and a s such, should be allowed to select its own
agents and conduct its own business. In the latter case the city i u
not a real corporation a t all, but only a subordinate branch or unit
of the State itself. So, in its Governmental or public character, the
Municipal Corporation is made by the State, one of its instrumentalities. It is the local depository of State Government and i t prescribes the political powers to be exercised for the public good and on
behalf of the State rather than for itself. As such the Municipal
Corporation is only a part of the governing machinery of the Sovereign State which creates it, and in this respect the Legislature ia
aupreme.
Hut in its proprietary or private character, the powers are concerned not so much with considerations connected with the Government of the State a t Large, but with the private advantage of the
compact community, which is incorporated a s a distinct legal person,
or corporate individual. As to such powers and property, and contracts made in reference thereto, the corporation is to be regarded,
quo ad hoc, as a private corporation. Then, the limitations on the
Legislative power over the property and contracts rights of a private
corporation throw light upon like questions as respects the municipal
corporation. As to private corporations, the Legislature has no power
of control, other than to dissolve them-it
cannot impair or affect
the property or contract rights of the corporation, but can only control
its right to exist. On this analogy, the Legislature, though i t possesses full power to dissolve the municipal corporation, cannot deprive
i t (or rather the people of the locality a t whose expense i t has been
acquired or for whose benefit i t was granted) of such property.
Third, a s to the question whether such action, in adopting a constitutional amendment securing local self-government, can be justified from a legal point of view, let us first see if the Federal Consti-
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tution forbids such action. Municipal affairs, being inherently local
in their origin and nature, a r e clearly left to the respective states by
the Federal Constitution. It i s inconceivable t h a t the Federal govcrnment should t r y to control the local affairs of the municipalities
scattered throughout this large country. So, municipal law is gen?rally regarded a s a matter to be determined and controlled by the
state acts and decisions, and if such a case gets to the Federal courts,
the state law will govern unless i t violates rights guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution, such a s the deprivation of property without due
process of law or the inpairment of contracts. There i s nothing in
the Federal Co~stitutionto prevent the state from giving, if i t sees
fit, by constitutional amendment, full jurisdiction of this matter to
the courts, thereby taking the control a s to details entirely away
from the Legislature. I n fact, perhaps fully one-half of t h e state
constitutions now have provisions forbidding legislative regulation of
internal affairs in the municipalities, and a number of other states
have forbidden Legislature to appoint local officers.
Though such a constitutional amendment is more certain, the
same desirable results have sometimes been reached by court action
showing further that such an amendment is justified from a legal
point of view. A New York court, in 67 N. E. 129, held unconstitutional an Act of the New York Legislature prohibiting anyone who
contracted with state or municipal authorities from requiring more
than 8 hours of labor a day. Ordinarily, when Legislature regulates
1:ibor contracts, i t only exercises a right to prescribe the terms of
contracts made by its agents ( i n connection with roads, bridges, and
such matters of public concern). But local concerns, a s municipal
buildings, adornment of streets, and improvement of city parks cannot be thus controlled by the state. The weakness of the New York
Act lies in the breadth of the language which includes contracts made
in connection with all sorts of municipal works, local a s well a s public.
On studying the past history of France, Germany and Russia,
one seems justified in drawing the conclusion t h a t no country can
live after destroying local self-government. The weak spot in our
system is the exaltation of state rights a t the expense of town rights
and local home rule. The relation of the states to the Federal govcmment is all right but the relation between the states and towns i s
:ill wrong, if the views of some courts a r e to prevail. It is the denial
of this fundemantal right of local self-government t h a t forces cities
to pay large salaries to officers appointed by the state, who a r e
under no responsibility to the city whose affairs they manage and
whose money they disburse. To remedy this, the principle should be
rstablished that the authority t h a t pays shall appoint and control in
all local matters. To help in restoring a better state of things, every
new Constitution should, in its bill of rights, recognise local self-government along with religious freedom and personal equality. It
should state expressly the right of Legislature to pass laws only on
application of the particular municipality affected, and even then subject to ratification by its own voters. If no new constitution is being
adopted, the provision securing local self-government can be set forth
in an amendment.
The foregoing argument i s based on the solid and rational foun-
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dation that the control of local affairs and consequential responsibilities should be vested in those who are directly interested and who will
reap the advantages of care and good management, or suffer the consequences of neglect and mismanagement. Local self-government will
create and cultivate in the citizen a feeling of civic patriotism, and
where civic virtues exist the local community will neither suffer from
public indifference and neglect, nor become tainted with political
"graft" or corruption.
Good government in local affairs is the best assurance of good
government in state and national affairs. Judging from the experience of the states adopting the principles herein advocated, the result
will work for the betterment of not only the municipality affected but
the state and nation as well. Under this doctrine, municipal misrule
and neglect cannot go beyond a certain limit. On the other hand,
the author is confident that there is in every municipality in this
land civic virtue enough, whenever called into activity, to secure a wellordered and honest municipal home rule.
References:
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This address w a s delivered by Julius M. Mayer of New York
who was a United States Circuit Judge of t h e Court of Appeals f o r
the Second Circuit. It w a s delivered before t h e Alumni of t h e Columbia Law School. Judge Mayer h a s since died, b u t previous t o
his death he sent t h e manuscript of i t t o J u d g e Gober with permission to print i t in t h e Foreword of Gober's Georgia Evidence, and
by permission of Judge Gober i t i s printed here.

The Lawyer and the Judge
Lawyers and judges a r e human beings. They have good days
and bad days, pleasant moods a n d disagreeable moods. There a r e
times when they a r e a t t h e i r best and times when they a r e a t t h e i r
worst.
But, in the main, subject equally t o human frailty, t h e lawyer
and the judge strive honorably and earnestly to do t h e i r duty to
the trust they have assumed. T h a t trust, i n t h e case of t h e lawyer,
is something more t h a n t h e endeavor t o a t t a i n t h e r e s u l t desired by
his client. It comprehends t h e obligations so to a c t a s to contribute
to the dignity of the administration of justice and to t h e respect
in which the law shall be held i n t h e community a t large. T h a t
trust, in the case of the judge, involves not merely the aspiration
to render a just decision but t h e obligation t o give all who have t h e
right to be heard a n attentive hearing and so t o conduct himself
as to inspire confidence in t h e earnest character of his endeavor
and the mental integrity of his decisions, whether they be regarded
as correct or not.
In this common effort, each in his own way, t o do his duty, t h e
lawyer and the judge must cooperate in t h e work-a-day tasks each
ia called upon t o undertake.
The lawyer i s entitled to t h e best t h e r e i s in t h e judge. T h e
least to which he and his cause a r e entitled i s a judge a l e r t and not
morn, interested and not indifferent, appreciative of t h e seriousness
of the cause to those concerned a n d not scornful because t h e controversy may seem petty in comparison with other causes.
The judge is entitled t o t h e best t h e r e i s in t h e lawyer. The
least to which the judge is entitled from the lawyer is conscientious
preparation, perfect frankness, good manners a n d relief f r o m unnecessary labors.
To accomplish any result of consequence, many small steps a r e
necessary. The artistic figure of justice standing on t h e eminence
of a fine temple would not have its place but f o r the infinite toil
with instruments in themselves not beautiful, which laid t h e foundation and built the superstructure upon which t h e figure ultimately rests.
To speak, then, of small things i s not a descent t o t h e petty,
if as a result, the lawyer will better understand t h e judge a n d t h u s
make easier the daily task of each.
There is probably no responsible court, Federal o r State, f i r s t
instance or appellate, which i s not working under g r e a t pressure.
Litigations arising out of o r a s a result of t h e war, t h e increase of
statute law, civil and criminal, national a n d state, t h e creation and
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development of new kinds of industries a n d businesses, t h e unceasi n g complexity of economic problems giving rise to questions of
constitutional and commercial law i n foreign a n d domestic commerce
have all combined to place a heavy burden on t h e courts.
Many courts, a t the moment, a r e i n serious need of more judges
a n d t h e time of judges should not be encroached upon uselessly o r
carelessly. A few- cases i n every court can wait f o r decision a n d
delay will not work injury b u t most cases should be decided promptly a n d t h e judge in t h e court of f i r s t instance should have t h e opportunity of giving them f a i r consideration; f o r not infrequently
his decision ends t h e litigation. I n order, however, physically to
read the papers in law suits not to speak of examining authorities
and writing opinions and memoranda much time must be occupied.
Thus, verbose affidavits, or other papers which d r a g i n extraneous matter or substitute argument for a simple statement of t h e
essential f a c t s a r e undue and unfair drafts upon his time. They
accomplish nothing; f o r t h e experienced judge readily sees through
them.
Inadequate o r inaccurate references t o t h e testimoney and
lack of reference a r e annoyances which add t o the physical labor
of t h e judge from which he should have been spared and the time
spent by him in searching f o r o r checking up t h e testimony, to which
h e might easily have been referred, might be spent much more
profitably.
It i s surprising, also, how extensively the word "brief" h a s become a nisnomer. This i s partly due to lack of courage and partly
to lack of careful preparation.
T h e law, in most instances, i s plastic. The lawyer studies a n d
makes his points. H e is the one who moulds and initiates. To him,
i s often due t h e credit of a sound o r a n able judicial decision because h e h a s pointed t h e way.
I f he h a s not t h e courage to emphasize t h e outstanding points
of t h e case and fills his brief with minor catchalls, he will not infrequently lose t h e advantage which his opponent gains by driving
home to t h e mind of the busy trial judge the major propositions anti
letting t h e driftwood go.
Nothing i s more important i n a brief either i n t h e court below
o r i n a n appellate court t h a n a n accurate, orderly and clear statement of t h e f a c t s and, nothing i s more important t h a n a succinct
presentation of the f a c t s with a knowledge so complete t h a t counsel
can readily t u r n to t h e record to substantiate a n y testimony questioned o r drawn into argument.
So. too, with the citation of cases. Resort t o encyclopedias of
law a n d the citation of a g r e a t mass of cases therein cited is the
lazy man's way of briefing so called. The lawyer who aids th,A,=
courts and soon becomes known a s able and reliable i s h e who h as
t h e courage and discernment to make selection a n d one case i n poiint
i s a s good f o r t h e purpose of convincing the court a s a hundred.
If a case closely i n point cannot be found, then, ordinarily, it
i s sufficient t o state t h e principle with reference to a recognized
writer such a s Cooley, f o r instance, and a limited number of cases
which though distinguishable, may show t h e trend of judicial
thought.
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The lawyer, who h a s not t h e courage of selection and depends
wholly on the judge in a court of f i r s t instance, forgets t h a t t h e
judge rarely has time t o make a s thorough a n independent investiation as he would wish and must depend largely on t h e assistance
lf counsel.
But the poor brief or t h e feeble argument i s due most usually
L O lack of preparation.
T h a t lack is obviously unjust to t h e client
and unfair to the court. T h e long and, sometimes, dreary hours
spent by men in their early days a t the bar i n t h e thorough preparation of the simplest cases a r e often t h e foundation of a n able and
seasoned career. No quotation should appear i n a brief unless its
writer has examined t h e case from which t h e quotation i s extracted
and nothing i s more annoying t o courts t h a t quotations isolated
from context where a reading of t h e case shows t h a t i t i s not in
point either on principle or authority and t h a t the quotation waB
an expression of t h e court i n another connection. I n brief making,
also, where the construction of statutes, ordinances o r regulations
made in pursuance of law a r e under discussion. i t i s a convenient
aid to the rourt, to incorporate t h e statute i n t h e brief on i n a n a p pendix thereto.
In briefs a s well a s in oral argument, i t is well t o be f r a n k and
concede a point which cannot be sustained. An equivocal answer to
rhe court, accomplishes nothing. It suggests weakness and lack
of confidence and no advocate i s so strong a s he who believes i n his
case and shows i t by his earnestness and his enthusiasm.
In describing events o r things, simple illustrations a r e often
useful. It must be remembered t h a t t h e court i s hearing about
the subject matter f o r the f i r s t time, while counsel, presumably,
have lived with the case. The nature and action of complicated
machinery in, f o r instance, a t o r t case can be much simplified i n
illustration by eliminating technical terms and resorting to terms
familiar to the lay mind. I recall t h e able presentation of a well
known patent lawyer in opening a very diffuclt case when referring
to a certain electrical instrumentality he said t h a t t h i s man was t h e
"Tight wad" who had his eye on the other instrumentality who was
the "spendthrjft". He vitalized these electrical instruments and
forces into human beings and, of course, what he meant was t h a t
while one instrument expended electricity unduly, the other checked
it. That illustration though, perhaps, inelegant, a t once explained
t h e action under discussion and remained i n the memory of t h e judge
long after many technical details had been forgotten. The strength
of the so-called country lawyer lies i n his ability to make his point
with homely illustrations, drawn from his knowledge of t h e animal
kingdom and the products of the field. He is keen in his knowledge
of human nature and he rarely takes the wisdom of t h e judge f o r
granted.
-Not the least important acquisition of a lawyer i s a well modulated voice. I t would be idle to deny t h a t even the healthiest;
judges, physically speaking, may show weariness a s t h e day grows
long, especially if they conscientiously concentrate on the argument
or trial in progress. The raucous voice i s wearing and the shouting voice almost unberable. The lawyer t h u s afflicted is prab-
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ably unconscious of the difficulty but no better service can be done
by his friends than frankly to suggest to him to t r y to cultivate his
voice.
I am not speaking tonight of jury trials. Advocacy in that
branch is an a r t by itself. But, the oratory of passion and of gesture is no longer necessary in addressing judges.
Then, there are some other tribulations of a judge, which may
seem trifling, but are time takers and irritants. The submission
of proposed conflicting orders upon notice of settlement where the
differences could readily be adjusted by f a i r minded counsel but
where failure to agree requires t h a t the judge should wearily check
up the differences, if he confines his labors to the papers or listens
to arguments a s to the details, if he is willing to hear a n oral presentation. So, also, in the preparation of records on appeal, where
weeks or months after the trial, the judge is expected t o remember
whether the witness testified that he did or did not see the defendant on Wednesday, the 3rd of April, and counsel are in controversy
as to an error in the stenographer's minutes or
where,
in the Federal Courts, counsel are unable to agree upon a
bill of exceptions a t law or a record on appeal in equity (and doubtless the same prevails in the State courts), when the exercise of
some patience and of a spirit of cooperation would result in an
agreement between counsel and thus a saving of time, which the
judge might more profitably employ.
In brief, the duty which the lawyer owes the judge is to agree
with his adversary to the fullest extent not inconsistent with the
protection of the rights of his client in respect of the detail and machinery attendant upon the average law suit.
Leaving now these considerations which may be regarded as
minor, a word or two may be said i n respect of the more important
relations which the lawyer bears to the court and which a t the
same time involve the dignity of the profession.
Codes of ethics are, of course, of great value a s expressing the
contemporaneous conception of the lawyer's duty, but codes of ethics do not always induce conduct in conformity with their rules
or principles.
Besides, there are certain rights which a lawyer has in respect
of public discussion which i t would be unwise to endeavor t o restrain, even if there were power so to do, and I doubt such power.
The lines between the discipline to which the bar may be subjected
and the right of free speech is very delicate and should not be meddled with. Yet, in the last analysis, the strong deterrent is the desire for good repute; for few lawyers are indifferent t o the favorable opinion of their brethcen a t the bar and of their brethren on
the bench. The lawyer and the judge rarely need any formula to
tell them what conduct is consonant with the dignity of the profession.
The tendency to conduct a private litigation through the agency
of press publicity seems to be growing instead of diminishing. The
newspaper reporter and publisher are not to be blamed. The lawyer
is furnishing them with the commodity known a s news. It is, of
course, very difficult to see what the lawyer gains by this plan of
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rsrlmpaign. If he thinks he may intimidate someone whom he supposes to be a weak judge, he may miss his guess and find t h a t he is
brfore a strong judge.
If he thinks t h a t he may influence a jury
about to be drawn, he may find t h a t t h e twelve men ultimately
chosen never head of the case. Such a plan of publicity campaign
tends to give laymen a n unpleasant impression of t h e law. They
see only the picture of snarling, undignified lawyers trying their
cases, as the expression goes, in t h e newspapers and t h u s misrepresenting the profession and causing humiliation to those who respect and love the profession and consider i t a privilege t o be par!
of it.
In respect of those lawyers who occupy public offices a s legal
:tdvisers to public bodies, i t is, of course, frequently necessary t h a t
they keep the public informed in regard to matters effecting t h e
public interest. This can be done in a manner entirely consistent
with the announcement of a policy OF t h e giving of information according to the orderly and dignified usages of the profession. The
extravagant predictions a s t o what will be accomplished in a particular litigation, civil or criminal, frequently fail t o come true.
The result is that the public i s led into doubt and confusion. The
impression sometimes goes abroad t h a t somehow t h e law has broken
down and that there is something wrong with judges and juries,
when the truth is t h a t t h e lawyer in public office who made t h e
dazzling promises a s to success never had a case t o s t a r t with and
yielded to the pressure of momentary public clamour or desire f o r
notoriety instead of being faithful to the high purposes and traditions of his profession.
It is an interesting fact, a s may be checked up by the recollections of events in any lawyer's lifetime, t h a t t h e lawyer who in private or public litigation departs from t h e ideals of t h e profession
usually is the tiny craft passing away in the night to oblivion. He
may have a little temporary renown of a certain kind but long a f t e r
he is forgotten, his professional brother who, day a f t e r day, h a s
done his work with a n eye single t o his duty to his client and t h e
court is sooner or later appreciated and leaves behind hime, if not
alwnys a great reputation, a t least a respected reputation.
I have been speaking about the lawyer. Let me say something
about the judge. There a r e some men whom t h e judicial life makes
solitary, but unless a man i s solitary by nature, i t is well f o r him
that he should move among men. The courts a r e dealing with
great human affairs, questions of welfare and liberty, question3
which reflect the problems of the commerce on land and sea and the
relations of men to each other in every conceivable aspect. I t is,
in my view, of benefit t o a judge t h a t he should have social relations
with the lawyer. That relation rubs off t h e rough edges. The lawyer discovers that the mysterious person called a judge i s pretty
much like anyone else. He has his little vanities, his particular opinions and generally he has t h e same desire f o r agreeable companionship as anyone else. The Judge by social contact with the lawyer
or the man of affairs learns of t h e new problems or if interesting
variations of the old problems with which t h e worlds of finance and
commerce are confronted and from conversation and discussion and
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even gossip, the judge i s kept in touch with the affairs of the big
outside world upon whose rights and relations he is daily adjucating.
Courtesy and reasonable consideration for the lawyer are
among the most important attributes of a judge. By this method
he gains the cooperation of the lawyer and the lawyer i s disposed
t o be more frankly helpful than he would be, if he feels t h a t he must
t r e a t with the judge a t arm's length.
On the other hand, one must be a judge t o realize how importa n t is the observance of rules of procedure and of court routine.
At times, these rules seem harsh, yet so constant i s the requirement
t h a t the court's business should be kept going t h a t compliance with
rules i s not a matter of choice with the courts but of necessity.
The respect i n which the court is held depends, of course, very
largely upon the judge. He will have not much difficulty, if he
will remember the simple terms of his oath of office. I wonder how
many men know the phraseology of t h a t oath. To read it, carries
its own comment and i t reads:
"I do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to
persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent on me
according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States; and that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic;
t h a t I wiYl bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this abligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; a n d that
I will well a n d faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am
about to enter. So help me God."

I know of no finer statement of the position which a judge
should take than t h a t expressed by a n eminent contemporary American, recently appointed to the highest judicial office in t h e g i f t of
his fellow countrymen. I doubt whether the letter to which I shall
refer was wisely read. Under date of July 13, 1921, when Mr. Chief
Justice T a f t announced t h a t he would cease to be a contributor to
t h e editorial column of a newspaper, he wrote:
"The degree in which a Judge should separate himself from general activities as a citizen and a mem,ber of the community is not usually fixed by
statutory law, but by a due sense of propriety, considering the nature of his
office, and by well-established custom. Certainly, in this country a t least.
a Judge should keep out of politics and out of a n y diversion or avocation
which may involve him in politics. It is one of those characteristic queer
inconsistencies in the British judicial system, which was the forerunner of our
own, t h a t the highest judicial officer in Great Britiiln, the Lord Chancellor,
is often very much in politics and has always been. He changes with each
adminiatration, and his is a political appointment; but all the other Judges
of the High Courts of England are a s little i n politics as in this country.
A Judge ohould avoid extra judicial activities, not only because they may
put him in a n attitude actually or seemingly inconsistent with absolute impartiality in the discharge of his judicial duties but also because he owea
hlis whole time and energy to his judicial work."

If then, the lawyer and the judge shall conscientiously attempt
-to do their work along the ideals of the great and responsible profession to which they belong in common, each will have done his
duty and, in the long run, i t makes small difference what fame each
may or may not attain.
In the history of the world, in the development and administra-
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tion of governments, the lawyer and the judge have played no small
part. They have borne their full share and responsibility in safewarding life and liberty and promoting t h e pursuit of happiness.
That responsibility is, if anything, greater today t h a n before, when
new problems are facing the world in every corner. It is for men
like ourselves, graduates of a great institution, who have had the
privilege of sitting under great teachers and learned men t o contribute our share in our humble way to the performance of t h e t r u e
duties of the lawyer and t h e judge and to safeguard the repute of
the profession. Our relations must be those of mutual respect and
of mutual regard t o which we shall be entitled only if we earn t h a t
right, and, in the future a s in t h e past, the lawyer and t h e judge
shall walk along the corridors of time, a r m in arm, in t h e common
aspiration to be true ministers of justice.
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Andrew J. Cobb, The Supreme
Court Judge
(BY A. W. C O Z A ~ T )
Opinions written by Judge Cobb appear in the Georgia Reports
from 100 Georgia to 128 Georgia., both inclusive. His first opinion
appears in the case of Behere v. National Cash Register Company,
100 G. 213, and his last opinion appears in the case of Sapp v. Williamson, 128 Ga. 743, filed July 13, 1907, but on the same date he
filed opinions in two other cases, to-wit: Hodges v. Stuart Lumber
Company, 128 Ga. 733; Rountree v. Gaulden, 128 Ga. 737. His reaignation took effect from October, 12, 1907.
An examination of our reports has led me to the following conclusions, which I believe to be correct:
1. No other Appellate Court judge in Georgia has ever rendered a s many opinions in cases simplifying and systematizing questions of pleading and practice.
See the following cases; Kelly v. Strouse & Bros. 116 Ga. 872;
Toole v. Edmondson & Seay Bros., 104 Ga. 776; Glover v. State, 128
Ga. 1 ; Watson v. State, 116 Ga. 607.
2. He rendered opinions in more cases which have been cited
more times, within the same length of time, than did any other
Georgia Appellate Court Judge.
See the following twelve cases;
Name of case.
No. of times cited.
.............................
.............................
Supreme Court. Court of App. Total
Toole vs. Edmondson & Seay
Bros., 104 Ga. 776
15
23
38
City of Dawson v. Dawson
Water Works Co., 106 Ga. 696
40
8
48
Mitchell v. Ga. & Afa. Rwy.
Co., 111 Ga. 760.
24
17
41
Forsyth Mfg. Co., v. Castlen,
112 Ga. 199.
26
26
52
W. &. A. RR. Co. v. Ferguson,
113 Ga. 708.
19
21
40
Welborn v. State,
114 Ga. 793.
36
17
63
Kelly v. Strouse & Bros.,
116 Ga. 872.
46
49
94
Langley v. City Council of Auguesta, 118 Ga. 590.
13
21
34
Cawthon v. State,
119 Ga. 395.
26
11
36
Moore v. Dublin Cotton Milla,
127 Ga. 609.
S
26
28
Moultrie Repair Co. v. Hill,
120 Ga. 730.
10
21
31
Rawlings v. State,
124 Ga. 31.
14
20
34
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3. He rendered the opinion in a case which has been cited
more times than any other case decided by a Georgia Appellate
Court, the one in the Kelly case-cited 94 times.
Chief Justice Logan E. Bleckley's greatest opinion, according
to his own judgment, was written in the Ellison case, 87 Ga. 691, and
this case has been cited by the Supreme Court 44 times and by the
Court of Appeals 23 times-total 67.
Mr. Justice William A. Little's greatest opinion was written in
the Powell case, 101 Ga. 9, which has been cited by the Supreme
Court 45 times, and by the Court of Appeals 20 times-total 65.
One of Mr. Justice Joseph Henry Lumpkin's greatest opinions
waB written in the Lyndon case, 129 Ga. 353, which has been cited
by the Supreme Court 26 times and by the Court of Appeals 47 times
-total 73.
One of Chief Justice Thomas J. Simmon's greatest opinions was
written in the Anglin case, 120 Ga. 785, which has been cited by the
Supreme Court 29 times and by the Court of Appeals 32 times-total 61.
4. Judge Cobb rendered opinions in many noted murder cases.
The first of these was in the Ryder case, 100 Ga. 528, and the last
was in the Glover case, 128 Ga. 1. The most famous murder case
in which he wrote an opinion, I presume, was the Rawlings case,
124 Ga. 31.
6. He was to the Supreme Court of Georgia what Joseph Story
was to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Georgia as a Litigant in the United
States Supreme Court
1.

GEORGIA V. BRAILSFORD E T AL., 2 DALLAS 402 (1792);
3 DALLAS 199 (1796.)
Hampton L. Carson in "The History of the Supreme Court" says:
"The first cause of note was that of the State of Georgia v. Brailsford
et al. In 1782, by an Act of Confiscation, a bond which had been
given, in 1774, by Kelsall and Spalding to Brailsford and others, alleged aliens, had been sequestrated to the State of Georgia, Brailsford
and his co-partners had brought suit on the bond in 1791, in the
United States Circuit Court f o r the District of Georgia. The State
had unsuccessfully applied for permission to assert her claim and
judgment for the plaintiffs was rendered. The State now filed her
bill in equity in the Supreme Court for an injunction to stay proceedings in the lower Court, and praying that the Marshal should be
directed to pay over the moneys in his hands to the treasurer of the
State. A, motion was subsequently made to dissolve the injunctioll
and dismiss the bill, but i t was allowed to stand until the next term,
but the right of the State was tried by a special jury, upon an amicable issue, before the Supreme Court."
The Court charged the jury, practically directing a verdict against
Georgia.
This was the f i r s t case tried by a jury in the Supreme Court.
Two other cases were tried by a jury in the Court.
It is an interesting fact that the first opinion which appears i n
the Reports was a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Johnson, being
in the case wherein Georgia was the plaintiff, reported in 2 Dallas
402, supra.

11.
CHISHOLM V. GEORGIA, 2 DALLAS 419 (1793).
Chisholm, a citizen of South Carolina, brought a suit against
the State of Georgia in the Supreme Court, and one of the questions
was whether under the Constitution a citizen of one State could sue
another State. Chief Justice Jay, writing the majority opinion of
the Court, (which was the most important opinion he ever write)
held t h a t the Court had jurisdiction. This decision brought about
the Eleventh Amendment. The decision produced great excitement.
The States were burdened with debts. Several States had been sued
and Hampton L. Carson said in his great work above quoted: "The
Legislature of Georgia responded by a statute denouncing the penalty
of death against any one who should presume to enforce any process
upon the judgment within its jurisdiction."
Mr. Carson is in error in this statement. The House of Representatives of the General Assembly of Georgia passed such a bill but
the Senate did not pass it, so f a r a s the records show. Hon. Robert
Alston, when he was President of the Bar Association of Georgia, in
his President's Address, stated the true facts touching this matter.
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111.
FLETCHER V. PECK, 6 CRANCH 87 (1810).
In "The Supreme Court of the United States," Hampton L. Carson thus speaks of this case: "The case of Fletcher v. Peck will
always be memorable as the first case of that long line of instances
in which the statutes of a State repugnant to the Constitution have
been held to be void. I t is the first judicial determination of a constitutional restriction upon the powers of the States. I t towers above
the decisions of a period of many years, important and imposing
though they are, and, with Marbury v. Madison, stands a s an outspur
of that magnificent range of adjudication which bear to our constitutional jurisprudence the relative strength and majesty of the Rocky
Xountains to our physical Geography. The State of Georgia had
sought by Legislative enactment to destroy rights acquired under s
previous statute of the same State, granting lands to an individual.
It held that a grant was a contract executed, the obligation of whicn
continued; and since the Constitution drew no distinction between
contracts executed or executory, the Constitutional clause must be so
interpreted as to comprehend both."
This case grew out of the Georgia "Yazoo Fraud Acts," and while
Georgia was not a party technically, she was vitally interested in
the issue.
IV.
CHEROKEE NATION V. GEORGIA, 5 PETERS 1 (1831).
A motion was made in the United States Supreme Court to reutrain by injunction the execution of certain laws of Georgia, in the
territory of the Cherokee Nation, the tribe claiming they had a right
to proceed as a foreign State. Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the
majority opinion of the Court, held that the tribe was not a foreign
Nation and could not maintain the action, the Court not having jurisdiction, and he further held that to maintain the action the Court
would have to exercise political power which was not within the province of the judiciary.
It is said that the opinion of Chancellor Kent, in favor of the
jurisdiction, had been obtained by counsel, William Wirt and John
Sergeant, before the bill was filed.

v.

WORCESTER V. GEORGIA, 6 PETERS 515 (1832).
William Wirt and John Sergeant, who appeared for the Cherokee
Nation in the Supreme Court, re-appeared a s Counsel for Worcester
in the above case, and Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion
of the Court, held: "The Cherokee Nation is a distinct community,
occupying its own territory with boundaries accurately described, in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force*** The Act of the State
of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in error was prosecuted, is, consequently void and the judgment a nullity."
Georgia treated this judgment with defiance and Worcester was
still kept in prison. President Jackson is reported to have said:
"John Marshall has made the decision, now let him enforce it." However, at the end of eighteen months Georgia relented and the prisoner was released.
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VI.
GEORGIA V. MADRAZZO, 1 PETERS 110; 7 P E T E R S 627.
I n this case, it was held: "Admiralty process cannot issue when
i t is not a case where the property is not in custody of a Court of
Admiralty, or brought within its jurisdiction, and in the possession of
any private person."
Georgia, therefore, lost this case.
VII.
SOUTH CAROLINA V. GEORGIA, 93 U. S. 13.
In this case the Supreme Court, construing the no-preference-port
clause of the Constitution, held t h a t discrimination a s between States
is what is prohibited, and not discrimination between individual ports,
and Congress is not forbidden to make a port in one State a port of
entry, while refusing to do so a s to a port in another State.
Georgia won this case.
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Recovery of Losses on Cotton Futures
Is one who deposits money with another a s "margins" f o r t h e purchase and sale of futures and who loses the money by subsequent fluclo:~tions of the market, entitled to recover i t ?
It is well established t h a t an executory contract f o r the sale of
cotton for future delivery where both parties knew t h a t the vendor
rspected to purchase to fulfill his contract and to put no skill, labor
nr expense therein and none entered into the consideration thereof
Ilut it was a speculation on chances, would be illegal ( I ) but if the
cnlton was to be bought and delivered a t once and skill, labor or exprnse entered into the contract, i t would be valid. ( 2 ) A later case
st:ltea the rule thus: The sale of cotton to be delivered a t a future
day where both parties a r e aware t h a t the seller himself expects t o
parchase to fulfill his contract and no skill and labor or expense enter
into t h consideration,
~
but the same is a pure speculation upon chances,
i:; contrary to the policy of the law and can be enforced by neither
party. ( : I ) As a general rule when money is paid over upon a n ilIcngnl contract it cannot be recovered back, the contract being executed
This i s t h e common law rule,
and both parties in pari delicto. ( 4 )
but as is so often the case statutes have nullified it. Section 4256 of
- --

-

-

Warren Lane & Co. v. Hewitt 45 G.a. 502.
"ranch
v. Palmer, 65 Ga. 210.
3 Thompson v. Cummi~ngs,68 Ga. 124.
4 Ingram v. Mitchell, 30 Ga. 547.
1
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the Civil Code of 1910 provides that money paid upon a gaming consideration may be recovered back from the winner by the loser if he
shall sue for the same in six months after the loss. Contracts for
the purchase and sale of cotton futures are gaming contracts. (j!
And in Forsyth Mfg. Co. vs. Sastlen the Supreme Court said that if it
is the intention of both parties to the contract that the goods shall
not be actually delivered but that there shall be a settlement of the
differences between them according to the market price of the article
on a given day, such a contract would be a wager and not enforcable
by either party. ( 6 ) A recent decision holds, however, that a contract f o r the sale of futures is not a gaming contract within the meaning of the Code Section cited above. (7) Consequently money paid
under such a contract may not be recovered back by the loser. (8)
The Court in the case just referred to was able to determine the
intention of the lawmakers by examining the statute from which the
Code Section was codified. These were the Acts of 1764 and 1765, (0)
which provided that persons who lose money or goods by playing or
betting a t any game whatever might maintain against the winner a
suit to recover the money o r goods so lost. I t seems quite evident
that buying or selling futures is not a "game," especially since dealing
in futures is treated by the statutes and the Code, separately from
other forms of gaming. It is interesting to note that the same conclusion a s that reached in Lassiter vs. O'Neill was held by the Supreme Court on different grounds before the adoption of the present
Code. (lo)
So another peculiarity has been pointed out in the provision of
our law set forth in Code Section 4256 which has always been a legal
freak. Broad as a r e the expressions used in that section they do not
cover the most pernicious form of gaming.

Argument of Counsel
"Argument of counsel shall be confined to the law and the facts
involved in the case then before the court, on pain of being considered
in contempt; and in all civil cases questions of law shall be argued
exclusively to the court, and questions of fact to the jury. Civil Code
of Georgia, 1910.
Parties have a right to appear by counsel, and i t is a privilege
of counsel to address the jury on the facts. The arguments of counsel
a s to the facts of a case, and the conclusions t o be reached from the
proven facts, is not to be considered a s mere argument tending to
sway the jury in its performance of its sworn duty, but should rather
be considered a s an aid,-as a very valuable aid given by one whose
duty it is to assist the jury in reaching a proper conclusion upon a
proven basis of facts.
It is held in the case of Daly vs. Hines, 55 Ga. 470 that "Argu6 Cunningham v. National B a n k of Augusta, 71 Ga. 400. 61
0 F o r s y t h Mfg. Co. v. Castlen, 1 1 2 Ga. 199, 37 S . E. 785.
7 Section 4256.
8

Lassiter v. O'Neill. 13'5 S. E. 78.

9 Cobb 725-727.

1 0 Thompson v. Cumming, 68 Ga. 124.

Am. Rep. 266.
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ment is not only a right, but a material one. It i s not a mere ornamental fringe upon the border of a trial."
The object of the argument i s first, that of a n aid to the court,
and second, that of a n aid t o the jury.
1. Appearance by counsel, is a n aid to the court in the ascertainment and application of the law, however profound the learning or
admirable the wisdom of the Bench.***The object is not to secure,
by management, or trick, o r dexterity, against the law and against
the evidence.*** Such is not the legitimate object of appearance by
counsel.+;^^ I t s object is to aid in the ascertainment of the truthin the strict, and, therefore, equitable administration of the laws of
the land.
Wynn vs. Lee, 5 Ga. 237. "The true view of the position of the
counsel, before the jury, i s t h a t i t aids or helps. The business of the
counsel is to comment on t h e evidence-to sift, compare and collate
the facts-to
draw his illustrations from the whole circle of the
sciences-to reason with the accuracy and power of the trained logician, and enforce his cause with all the inspiration of genius, and
adorn i t with all the attributes of eloquence. It is the business of the
jury to listen, to be informed, but not to obey.*.*"."
Garrison vs.
Wilcoxson 11 Ga. 159.
"Remarks of counsel while addressing the jury, which do not
undertake to introduce any material fact not disclosed by the evidence,
but which a r e merely oratorical in character, do not constitute sufficient ground f o r declaring a mistrial." Western & Atlantic Railroad Co. vs. York 128 Ga. 687.
In the above mentioned case the remarks made by counsel in his
address to the jury were in substance a s follows: "Man is the noblest
creation of God. God made no greater creation than man. He i s t h e
grandest product of Divine handicraft; and he hedged about him the
law 'Thou shalt not kill'.*** 'The statutes of the Lord a r e right'.
'Thou shalt not kill' i s the statute of the Lord God Almighty. It was
made for the protection of the Lord of creation-for man, and i t applies to a railroad corporation just a s much a s i t does to an individual.
If a man i s dead by the reckless negligence of the servants and
agents of the railroad corporation, the full consequences to him a r e
the same; he i s just a s dead a s if he had died by the uplifted and directed and murderous hand of his brother man. The shedding of innocent blood i s just the same-just
the same. Our land i s defiled
when innocent blood is shed therein, whether i t be by the hand of a
railroad corporation o r whether i t be by the murderer's hand or some
one contending in a death grapple with his brother man; and the curse
of God, which i s charged against that, i s upon i t just t h e same.
Gentlement of the jury, when George W. York died on t h a t public
crossing in the City of Acworth, last October was a year ago, his innocent blood stained the right of way of this defendant." These remarks were considered by the court t o be purely impassioned oratorical eloquence, and considered not prejudicial to the defendant to the
extent t h a t a new trial should be granted.
In a n earlier case, the case of Western and Atlantic Railroad Co.
vs. Cox. 115 Ga. 712, i t seems t h a t the reverse had been held by the
Supreme court; if not the reverse, there is certainly some dissimilarity
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between the holding of the court in the two cases. In this case, counsel f o r the plaintiff in the lower court, i t being an action for damages
f o r wrongful death, in his argument to the jury used t h e following
expression: "The only way to reach a railroad is to make i t pay
money. A railroad has no soul, no conscience, no sympathy and no
God." Upon these statements being made counsel f o r defendant
asked that t h e jury be retired, and moved the court to declare a mistrial on the ground t h a t the language was inflamatory and improper.
The judge in the lower court refused to do so, and i t is held by the
Supreme court t h a t the lower court erred in so doing.
I n the case of Patterson vs. the State. 124 Go. 409, the following words were used by the solicitor-general in his argument to the
jury: "The blood of this dead man calls upon you to punish this man
and protect his family and relatives; and unless you have the manhood to write ik in your verdict, you should be exiled from the good
county of Heard." Motion f o r a mistrial upon this ground was overruled in the lower court. The Supreme court, in ruling upon the
question expresses itself a s follows: "We do not think this language
called f o r a mistrial, or a rebuke from the judge. It introduced no
fact, but was merely a forcible and possibly an extravagant method
adopted by counsel of impressing upon the jury t h e enormity of the
offense and the solemnity of their duty in relation thereto.*** Flights
of oratory and false logic do not call f o r mistrials or rebuke. I t is
t h e introduction of facts not in evidence t h a t requires the application
of such remedies."
Attempts to arouse indignation against crime and appeals to the
jury to show no mercy to crime, but to unflinchingly administer the
criminal laws a r e not grounds f o r a new trial. Nix v. the State
149 Ga. 309.
As t h e logical conclusion to be reached from the foregoing statements of law, and the cases decided thereunder, i t seems a s though
much is left to the honesty and fairness of the attorney arguing before the jury a s to whether o r not he shall confine himself strictly
to a logical expounding of the conclusion to be reached from the facts,
or whether he shall attempt to mislead t h e jury by forensic eloquence
and false logic. Oratorical eloquence should be used t o impress the
jury a s t o the facts, and t o lead them to a logical conclusion, and not,
a s i s so often the case, t o play upon their prejudices and emotions, in
a n attempt to cause them to reach a verdict not in accordance with
the law and the facts of t h e case.

Construction and Interpretation of Wills
T h e question of t h e construction and interpretation of wills
receives a great deal of attention, t h e wording of wills, creating
estates i n remainder and reversion, quite often being t h e cause of
litigation.
An estate i n remainder i s one limited t o be enjoyed a f t e r another estate i s determined o r a t a time specified i n t h e furture, and
is either vested o r contingent1. A vested remainder i s one limited
1 Civil Code Para. 3674.
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to a certain person a t a certain time o r upon t h e happening of a
necessary event. A contingent remainder i s one limited t o a n uncertain person o r upon a n event which may or may not happen2.
In Georgia, t h e law favors t h e vesting of remainders i n all cases of
doubt, and in the construction of wills, words of survivorship shall
refer t o the death of the testator in order t o vest remainders, unless
a manifest intention t o t h e contrary appears3. Of course, i n all
cases, the intention of the testator is sought, and t h e court gives
effect to the same a s f a r a s i t may be consistent with t h e rules of
law4. The question of whether a testator manisfestly intends t h a t
words of survivorship should refer t o t h e death of another in a given case will depend upon the language of the will.
The use of the word "then" in wills i s perhaps t h e revolving
point in most of the controversies. I n t h e case of Patterson v. Patterson i t was held t h a t t h e use of the word "then" i n t h e will i n
controversy clearly indicated t h a t a fee simple estate was vested in
the daughter, subject t o be divested if she died without child o r
children prior t o the death of the life tenantb.
On t h e contrary, i t was held in the case of Roberts v. Wadley
that the use of t h e word "then" i n t h e will manifestly showed t h a t
there was no uncertainty a s to who should take under t h e will and
that the remainder vested indefeasibly i n t h e persons appointed t o
takes.
I n the earlier case of Dudley v. Porter, words of survivorship
expressed in a will were held t o refer t o the death of one other than
the grantor7. The word "then" in this will was equivalent t o the
expression "in t h a t event." I n this case there was a repugnancy
between two clauses of the will and i t was held t h a t the f i r s t should
govern, since where two clauses a r e in irreconcilable contradiction
to each other, t h e f i r s t shall prevail.
When, however, the latter clause is i n explanation of t h e former, then the latter clause i s not repugnant t o t h e former, and t h e
former may be controlled by it. I n Georgia, where construction
does not favor estates tail and where estates tail have long been
prohibited, words of limitation over a f t e r a failure of issue a t t h e
death, may explain words in t h e instrument previously used, which
import a n intention t o create a n estate tail. The law of Georgia
inhibits entails, and by the a c t of 1821 (Cobb's Digest 169) endorses
the inhibition by enlarging them into estates in fee simple.
The recent case of Ethridge v. Leaptrot e t al. clearly demonstrates the unbroken line of decisions where words of survivorship
manifestly refer to t h e death of another than t h e testators. I n thia
case the testator devised lands in t r u s t f o r the use of L., t h e wife of
the testaor's son J., and the children of L., living and thereafter
Civil Code Para. 3676.
Para. 3680, Moore v. Cook, 153 Ga. 840 (113 S. E. 536).
4 Oivil Code Para. 3900.
6 147 Ga. 44 (92 S. E. 882).
6 156 Ga. 35.
7 16 Oa. 613.
8 134 S. E. 298.
2

3 Civil Code
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born, by her or other lawful wife that J. may have, and provided
t h a t should L. predecease J., then her interest should go to children of J., and on death of J. and wife trust should terminate and
property should go to children then living of J., and it was rightly
held by Judge. Hardeman, who tried the case below, "that the remainder passed to the children surviving J. and wife or living at
their death." Plaintiff in error was the child of a daughter of J.
and L. The child's mother survived the testator, but predeceased
her parents, J. and L. In this case, the words "then living" clearly
referred to those children of J. and L. living a t the death of J. and L.
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Recent Decisions
Husband and Wife; Transfer of Title for Purpose of Obtaining Credit;
Nobice; Claim.
An execution in favor of plaintiff and against defendant was levied upon
a certain tract of land. Thereupon the Mfe of the defendant herein interposed
a statutory claim and a n equitable amendment alleging t h a t the land was her
Property; that she furnished the money a n d 'Paid for the land out of her own
separate money, with the request and understanding that the actual paper
title was t o be made to her and in her name! The husband persuaded her
to have the title made to him so t h a t upon It he could gain certain credit
in furtherance of his business operations. The title was ,thus i)n him a t the
time of execution and claim and had never been i n the claimant. There was
no evidence to show notice to the plaintiff of the wife's equity. Ne Smith.
Vs. Calder, #5280 Supreme Court of Ga. 10-13-26.
The general rule of law covering the point is not specifically codified In
the statutes of this state, therefore to ascertain the law several code aectione,
and the decisions thereunder, must be examined. [Section 4526 of the oode
states that a n old principle that is appMcaible t o the case at bar, "The equity
of a party who has been misled is superior to that of him who willfully misleads him." Further section 4,528 states "Possession of land is notice of
whatever right o r title the occupant has. Possession by t h e husband with t h e
wife is presumptively his possession, 'but it may be rebutted." Section 3011
of t h e code further shows t h e law to tbe "A married woman may make contracts with other .persons; but when a transaction between husband and wtfe
is attacked for fraud by the creditors of either, t h e onus is on the husband
and wife to show that the transaction was fair. If the wife has a separate
estate, and purchases property from other persons than her husband, and
t h e property is levied on as the property of the husband, the onus is upon
t h e creditor to show fraud, or that she did not have the means wherewith
to purchase the property."
From the foregoimg statutes it is clear that in this case t h e claim of the
wUe is of no legal effect and cannot therefore attach to the land.In sustenance of this view and bearing out t h e clearly defined statutes .the following Georgia cases a r e cited: "If the legal title to land be in t h e husband
and he hold the possession thereof under such .title, and the title a n d possession s o remain until one who has given credit on t h e faith that the property
was the husband's, without a n y notice of the wife's equity, reduces his debt
to judgment, the lien of such judgment will bind the land and will I& enforced against a secret equity of the wife, resulting from the fact t h a t her
Vs. Dansby, 58/79.
money paid for the land."-Zimmer
The case of Humphrey Vs. Copeland, 541543, is also strictly i n point as is
Brown Vs. West, 70/201; and Burt Vs. Kuhen, 113/1143.
I n Ford Vs. Blackshear Manufacturing Company, 140/670, t h e court
said: "If a wife, having a n equitable title to land to which a deed is taken
in t h e name of her husband, permits him to hold the property and use it
in his ;business and commercial transactions for the purpose of obtaining
credit, and a third person, without notice of the equity, extends credit to the
husband on the faith t h a t the land ie his, the wife, after the creditor has reduced his debt to judgment, will be estopped from asserting title to the land
a s against the lien of the judgment, although before rendition of the judgment t h e husband, in recognition of the equity, may have conveyed t h e land
t o her." Also Krueger Vs. MacDougald, 148/429, is directly in point.
With these cases and the case of The Om Shoe Company Vs. Lee, 159/523,
which is identical in point we feel that t h e wife's claim is in effect nil.
Automobiles-Motor
Vehicle Acts-Action
by driver of car w h k h had
stopped along highway with bright lights burning against owner of c a r which
approached and collided with the automobile of plaintiff and injuring him.
Judgment for t h e plaintiff and by the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed.
"Standing c a r and car approaching from front a r e meeting in sense of statute
requiring mss meeting to t u r n to t h e right: Where motor car is !brought to
a stop along highway and another car approaches it from in front a r s a r e
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"meeting" In sense oi laws of 1921, page 257 section 3; Park's Annotated
Code Supplement of 11922, Section 828 (uu-7), providing that cars meeting
must t u r n to the right." Roberts vs. Phillips, 134 Southeastern Reporter,
Page 837.
Whenever any operator of a motor vehicle or motorcycle shall meet on
a public street or highway, any person or persons riding or driving one or
more horses, or any other draf? animal, or a n y other vehicle, approaching
in t h e opposite direction, the operator shall turn his vehicle to the right a0
as to give one-half of the traveled roadway, if practimble, and pt fair opportunity to the other t o pass by without unnecessary interference; and if traveling in the same direction, he shall pass to the left side of the person or
vehicle overtaken, and the person or vehicle overtasken shall give him a fair
opportunity to pass. Acts of 1921, page 257, sectlon 3; Park's Annotated Code
Supplement of 1922, Section 828 (uu-8).
Where driver after bringing automobile t o stop on left side of highway,
alighted therefrom and placed himself in front of it, leaving c a r atanding
with headlights #burning, and was r u n into by approaching car, i t was error
to fail to charge that it was duty to operate motor vehicle so as t o give to
other operators the right to one-half of he traveled roadway, if practicable.
Held also t h a t where plaintiff stopped automobile on left-hand side of road and
on dark and rainy night and was injured by approaching car; it was error
to fail to charge the jury that it was t h e duty of the one operating motor v*
hicle on dark and rainy night on left-hand side of road to be on alert t o
prevent 4njury to himself o r t o other persons lawfully on highway. Further
held t h a t inasmuch as t h e motor vehicle law does not require all motor vehicles to be equipped with dimmers, the refusal by the court to charge t h a t
irt was the duty of the plaintiff to have automobile so equipped, did not constitute error.
Husband and w i f ~ A l i m o n y - D o w e 1 ' - Y ~ ' s
SupportEquit&le
Can&lation of Deed-Husband's
Conveyance t o Defeat Wife's Riglit of AlimonyReturn of Wife and Child t o Home of Husband ancl Father. A husband in
order t o defeat the claim of his wife for alimony for herself and for her minor
child, executed a conveyance purporting to convey all of his interest i n certain lands t o his mother, f o r a valmlAe consideration, and the deed was duly
recorded. Subsequently t h e husband drove his wife and the minor child from
his home, whereupon t h e wife instigated her suit for alimony for herself and
her child. The husband, fearing exposure, sent for his wife and child and
they being in ipnorance of said deed returned t o his home and Itved with him
until he died. Action was brought by wife on her own behalf and a s next
friend for her minor child against the mother of her deceased husband praying that said deed be cancelled and set aside and asking for general relief;
HELD, t h a t the court did not err in dismissing the amended petition upon
general demurrer. "Husband's deed, executed to defeat claim for alimony
cannot be caqcelled in equity where wife returned to husband's home and
lived with him until his death, rendering judgment for alimony impossible."
The petition alleged that t h e sole purpose of the execution of the deed was
to defeat plaintiff's right of alimony, and since the cruel treatment on the
part of the husband was condoned by the wife by her returning to him and
the contemplated suit for alimony was abandoned, and t h e husband had departed this life, no judgment for alimony could ever be rendered. Such judgment being imp~ssi~ble,
therefore equity has no jurisdiction or power to cancel t h e deed. Held also that there is no statute in Georgia, prohibiting the
husband's voluntary conveyance to defeat his wife's right of dower, save as
to lands to which title came through her. There being in this State no statute
inhtbiting the sale of land by t h e husband for the purpose of defeating his
wife's claim of dower, save as to lands t o which t h e title came through her.
a n actual sale and conveyance, although made for the purpose of defeating
dower, will be upheld in favor of the purchaser against the widow's claim
after the death of the husband. Sorrells vs. Sorrells, 134 S. E. 767, Harber
st a1 vs. Harber, 152 Georgia 93 (3) Flowers vs. Flowers 89 Georgia 632. I n
this respect a voluntary conveyance stands upon the same footing and has
the same effect a s a conveyance based upon a n actual sale. Pruett vs. Cows a r t 138 Georgia 756. I n thie case i t was held in part, that a voluntary conveyance by a husband of land in which he had an undivided interest as heir
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of a former wife, would defeat the claim of dower asserted by his second wife
after his death, notwi.thstanding that such conveyance redted that a part of
the consideration was that the grantor was to remain in possession of the
lands and receive the benefits as long a s he lived.
Wife need not join in deed of husband to land not derived through her
or from her, ,in order to ,bar dower. 92 Georgia 260: On issue whether hus!band's deed defeating dower was bona fide, his will, subsequently executed,
in which he made no provision for his wife, would not be relevant. 89 Georgia 632 (3): The Supreme court in the 89th. Georgia page 632, held that so
long as the conveyance was bona fide, it mattered not that the purchase money remains unpaid. Prior to the act of 1826 the widow was entitled to dower
out of all land of which husband was seized during coverture. The Supreme
Court has also held that a .sale by a sheriff after the death of the husband
under execution against him, does not divest the widow of her right of dower
and that the purchaser a t such sale takes the land subject thereto. Bee,
121 Georgia 429.
Bills and Notes-Genuineness
of Inclorsement.
A suit filed by a n insurance company in the U. S. District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia set up that the company issued a number of
drafts on itself payable to named persons; that these were each presented by
the defendant bank for payment apparently indorsed by t,he proper payees
and payment made and the clrafts taken up; but i t was later discovered by
the insurance company that each payee indorsement was a forgery and
promptly thereafter demand was made on the banlc for repayment of the entire sum a s money had and received, and in a second count as damages for
breach of a n implied warranty of title and right to collect the drafts. One
of the defenseses set up hy the answer was t h a t the loss to the company was
due to its own negligence in issuing and paying the drafts over so long a
period of time without discovery of the forgeries. General and special demurrers to this plea were filed and sustained. The Court holding:
The drawee, who iR also the drawer of a draft, presented for payment by
a ,bank with the names of the payees indorsed thereon is not bound to know
the genuineness 01 .the indorsements or to make. inquiry before payment, but
a s between them presentation of the draft by the bank is a n implied warranty that by genuine indorsements it is the true holder and en.titled to collect it. Insurance Company of North America vs. Fourth National
Bank
of Atlanta 1 2 Fed. (2d) 100.
The relation here should be distinguished from that of banlc a n d depositor.
1 Leather Manufacturers vs. 'Merchants Bank 128 U. S. 26. Where one accepts forged paper purporting to be his own and pays it to a holder for value
received he cannot recover the payment. 2 8 C. J. 606. U. S. Bank vs. Georgia Bank 6 L. Ed. 334. 1 0 Wheat or 333. By requesting payment of a draft
a holder impliedly warrants that he has a good title and a right t o sell. 3 Gt%
Code 4277 ' L a t h e r Manufacturers Bank 128 U. S. 26. Since this is true. it
follavs .that where payment is made to a person holding a n instrument under
a forgecl indorsement, the person paying the same may recover the payment
from him. 4 Yatesville Banking Co. vs. Atlanta Fourth National Bank 10 Ga.
Appeals 1. 72 S. 'E. 528 Hartman vs. Henshaw 1 3 L. Ed. 653. The drawee
owes no duty to the holder to examine and ascertain whether the indorsements
were genuine. 5 Oommissioners Evchange Bank vs. Nassau Bank 9 1 N. Y. 74.
A transferee of securities is not bound to notify the transferor of a lack of
genuineness of the securities or of the title thereto, until the lapse of a reasonable time after the discovery of the fact. 6 U. S. Bank vs. Bank Fed. 855.
The diligence required is not in making the discovery but in giving notice
thereafter. 7 U. S. vs. Clinton Nat. Bank 159 P. A. 46, 23 L. R. A. 615.
The principles set forth in these cases have apparently been taken for
granted i n Georgia or a t l a s t most of them ,have never been' adjudicated prdbably because the questions have never arisen.
SALES--Failure of consicleration and implied \\ra.rtxnties in Sale.
Felder vs. Neeves. Court of Appeals of Georgia Oct. 13, 1926. 135 South
Eastern reporter gags 219.
Action for price of goods where defendant pleaded failure of consideration
and breach of warranty in that the machinery was unsuited for purpose intended.
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Hardee vs. Carter, 94 Da. 482. An action for the purchase price of goods
cannot be altogether defeated by a plea of total failure of consideration, unless
the evidence shows tha.t they were totally worthless for any purposes.
Trippe vs. McLain 87 Ga. 536. Where. a s in the instant case, t h e evidence
clearly shows that the machine which was the subject matter of the contract
could have been repaired a t a reasonable cost, and when so repaired, would
,have performed the service for which i t was purchased, a general finding
Of the jury in favor of the defendant oi his plea of total failure of consideration is not supported by the evidence and must be set aside.
Compton vs. Woodruff, Ga. App. 803. 1An express warranty excludes a n
implied warranty of the same o r a closely related subject, but not a n implied warranty on a n entirely different suibject.
Barber vs. Singletary 1 3 Ga. App. 171. Thus where the defense exclusively relied upon t h e breach of a n express warranty, the judge should
not charge upon the subject of implied warranty.
I n a suit for the purohase price of machlnery, while the defendant cannot
claim the benefit of 'both a n alleged spedal warranty as to ,quality and the
general warranty implied (by the law to exlst in the absence of express warranty, he nevertheless is entltled to set up inconsistent pleas a n d claim the
benefit of such deferme as he may, under the proof, be entitled to, and where,
as here the defendant pleads a n express warranty whereby the seller guaranteed that the engine was capa~bleof performilng work of a particular kind and
character, a n d also s e t up that the machinery bargained for wae totally unsuited for the purposes for which it was intended to be used, the judge did
not e r r in charging the law governing express warranties a s controlling in the
case, in t h e event the jury should find there was such a n agreement, and In
thereafter charging t h e jury what would be the alternative rule, under the
law of implied warranty in event t h a t they should find in favor of the plaintiff's contention that no such express warranty had been actually made.
Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff ibrings error. Reversed.
Parties Suit on Note, Transferee and Transferor.
McMillian vs. Spencer. Supreme Court of Georgia Sept. 18, 1926. 136
Southeastern Reporter 182.
The plaintiff suing as transferee of the note did not join t h e tmnsferor
(the payee named in the note) a s party defendant. T h e defendants answer
admitted execution of the note, a n d pleaded in avoidance thereof t h a t the
note was executed without consideration, that the plaintiff was not a bona tide
holder for value, but that he had received it under a collusive arrangement with the transferor to protect the latter as a n innocent holder against
the defense of the maker. I t was not certain that the defense would be
sustained a s against the plaintiff, even conceding that the note was without
consideration; consequently the defendant amended his answer so a s to set
up a claim for judgment over against the transferor if t h e defendant should
be held lbble to the plaintiff, and to that end prayed t h a t the transferor be
made a party defendant. It was upon order allawing this amendment t h a t the
bill of exceptions assigns error. Judgment affirmed.
Code Section 6410.
A, defendant to a n y suit o r claimm i n the .Superior Court, whether such sult
be for legal or equitable relief, may claim legal or equttarble relief, or rboth,
by framing proper pleadings for the purpose, and sustaining them by eufficient evidence.
Code Section 5411.
Any defendant may also ff it is necessary t o obtain complete relief, make
necessary parties.
Code Section ,5406.
T h e 'Superior Courts of this State, on the trial of any civil m e , shall
give effect to all the right8 of the parties, legal o r equitable o r ,both, and
apply on such trial remedies o r relief, legal or equitable or both, in favor of
either party, such as the nature of the case may allow o r require.
Third persons whose rights a r e involved in equibble plea, may
54/310.
be made party.
61/113, 117. Superior Court has jurisdiction under thls section to pro-
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ceed to do justice when all parties of interest a r e before it.
Code Section 6408.
Any person claiming equitable relief may make all necessary parties t o
secure equihble relief, either a t the beginning of his suit or afterwards by
amendment; and nlay make amendment in matter or form or substance.
124/165.
Owner of land may be made party to suit to recover property
brought in name oi one who had collusion with owner of land.
56/222. Parties being necessary which could be added in equity only,
equity will enjoin proceeding a t law and administer proper relief.
Those laws make radical changes in the law relating t o procedure and
there can be no doubt, from application of plain language of these statutes,
that the defendant had the right t o set up the matter urged and relied on
i n his plea. and also to have the transferor made a party for the purpose of
molding a n appropriate decree against him as the facts may justify. I t is
urged that t h e amendment should not have been allowed, as the plaintiff
should not be delayed on account of a n y issue between the defendant and the
tmnsferor. If t h a t would make a difference, the plaintiff in this is not complaining and it would not afford the transferor and ground of complaint.
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Cases on Constitutional Law
(With Supplement)
BY JAMES
PARKERHALL
Professor of Law, and Dean of the University of Chicago Law School
West Publishing Co., 1926

The latest edition of Dean Hall's excellent work on Constitutional Law i s enhanced in value by a n up-to-date supplement.
The book, which is one of the American Casebook Series, cites
decisions taken from both Federal and State statutes. I n compiling
a number of cases that will clearly explain the principles a s set
forth in our Constitution, the author has been forced to use a n
abundance of material, and in order to confine his work to one volume, he has found i t necessary, not only to omit all argument of
counsel, but in many instances, in order to condense them, to rewrite facts.
As explained in the preface, in order to meet the requirements
of the teacher, the book has been arranged in short chapters.
The book proper is divided into three parts. 'Preliminary Topics',
constitutes the first p a r t ; 'Fundamental Rights', the second; 'The
Federal Government', the third.
The first main-division is opened by a series of cases explaining
the making of various constitutions throughout the nation, and also
cites cases under the head of changes in the constitutions. The next
subject taken up i s the 'Function of the Judiciary in Enforcing
Constitutions', and the opening division is concluded with, 'Separation and Delegation of Powers of Government'.
The second division clearly explains each of the fundamental
rights, a s set forth, in the Constitution of the United States.
In the third division i s found a n outstanding feature i n the
book. This feature is the chapter on Federal procedure, which
might easily be used a s a text on a short course on t h a t subject.
The supplement, which in itself includes some 400 pages, is
arranged i n the same manner a s the main book. The supplement
includes a n additional chapter on the much mooted question of
National Prohibition, and cites many of the conflicting decisions
on the aforesaid question.
The book i s spite of i t s excellent qualities, i s necessarily, because of the subject, bulky, and can hardly be fitted in the average
short law course. The writer, however, expresses the hope of reducing the size in a later edition.
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CASES ON CODE PLEADING. BY ARCHIBALD H. THROCKMORTON, PROFESSOR O F LAW I N WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY. WEST PUBLISHING CO., ST. PAUL, MINN.
This case book contains a collection of cases and other material f o r the use of the lawyer and student. Professor Throckmorton unquestionably has given us one of the most practical treatises
of t h e system of Code Pleading. This book gives u s many cases
that the student may obtain the more important rules and principles, a s those principles a r e t h u s found in t h e codes of t h e different
States.
he preference in t h e section of cases has been given t o the
most important ones, by which the system of code pleading has
evolved and reached its present day development. New York in
1848, was t h e first state to adopt the system; now there a r e more
than thirty S t a t e s t h a t use Code Pleading. Mr. Throckmorton has
inserted in t h e notes, information a s t o the rules in the several jurisdictions and reference t o cases, magazines, and articles containing
discussion that will be helpful t o the student.
We know the importance of pleading, and the subject of code
pleading is constantly growing in importance, t h e tendency of most
states i s to simplify and remove the burdensome technicalities t h a t
existed with the Old Common Law form of pleading, and a s a result
many obstacles have been removed which otherwise would cause
delay and unnecessary expense.
Professor Throckmorton has given us a n admirable work t h a t
will meet with t h e approval of all who wish t o learn more upon the
subject. The one volume consists of 912 pages, including a thorough index. The price is $5.50 per copy. The contents a r e a s
follows :
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